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In recent years, police legitimacy has generated a great deal of scholarly attention. 
Numerous studies carried out in a variety of settings have demonstrated that citizens are 
more likely to perceive the police as a legitimate authority when they interact with 
citizens in a procedurally fair way. In turn, citizens become more likely to accept police 
decisions, comply with the law, and cooperate with the police. Yet until very recently, 
scholars have only focused on citizen perceptions of legitimacy while neglecting the 
perspective of the police themselves. It may very well be that the police believe other 
ideals are more important than procedural justice in terms of establishing legitimacy. 
Accordingly, Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe suggest that legitimacy should be 
treated as an ongoing dialogue between power-holders and audiences. The present study 
adds to a very limited body of research applying this dialogic model to understand 
legitimacy by surveying a nationally representative sample of U.S. police executives 
about how they believe citizens residing in different areas of the community evaluate 
their agencies and their officers. Findings suggest that respondents do in fact appear to be 
aware that procedural fairness is important to citizens in terms of establishing legitimacy. 
However, respondents do not appear to realize that citizens are more likely to cooperate 
with the police when they perceive them as legitimate. Instead, they believe performance 
is the key to generating cooperation. There also appear to be key differences in how 
officers believed they are perceived by residents of high crime areas and residents of low 
viii 
crime areas. Finally, the present study considers whether individual characteristics of the 
responding officers moderate the strength of relationships between key theoretical 
variables and legitimacy outcomes. In a similar fashion, the present study explores the 
possibility that officers believe citizens’ perceptions of collective efficacy, disorder, their 
perceived risk of being caught and punished for breaking the law, or their cynicism 
toward the law moderate the aforementioned relationships. Practical and theoretical 
implications are discussed in the final chapter.
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Policing in the United States has experienced numerous changes throughout the 
last two centuries—twice undergoing comprehensive reforms (Kelling & Moore, 1988). 
The most recent reform movement came during the 1980s in response to rising crime 
rates, civil unrest, research that questioned police methods, and highly publicized police 
riots such as that which occurred at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in 
Chicago, Illinois (Pelfrey, 2000). What ensued were many attempts by scholars and the 
police to improve the philosophy of policing. For example, agencies around the country 
experimented with community- and problem-oriented policing beginning in the 1980s. In 
the 1990s, Commissioner William Bratton of the New York Police Department 
championed his Compstat managerial philosophy, citing it as one of the primary reasons 
for the dramatic crime decline New York experienced throughout the decade (Bratton, 
1997). After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, many agencies sought to adopt 
an “intelligence-led” philosophy (Ratcliffe, 2008). The tenets of each of these 
philosophies vary widely but the underlying goal of each is to better address the crime 
problem in the U.S. More specifically, they represent an effort on the part of the police to 
be more proactive in dealing with crime. 
The ultimate form of proactivity is prevention. How can the police prevent would-
be offenders from breaking the law? Historically, the criminal justice system has been 




rewards associated with breaking the law. When the risk of punishment for a certain 
behavior is swift, certain, and severe enough, offenders will elect not to engage in said 
behavior (Beccaria, 1983; Nagin, 1998, 2013). If deterrence is the goal, the police are 
charged with creating and sustaining a credible risk of being caught breaking the law. 
This is a difficult task because the police simply cannot be everywhere at once. As such, 
social order is largely contingent upon the extent to which citizens self-regulate their 
behavior (Tyler, 1990; Weber, 1978). Self-regulation occurs when citizens believe the 
law (and by extension, authorities like the police who enforce the law) is legitimate and 
comply with the law because they feel it ought to be obeyed (Tyler & Huo, 2002). 
How then, can the police increase the frequency with which people self-regulate? 
In his seminal book Why People Obey the Law, Tom Tyler (1990) proposed that the most 
effective way for police (and other government social control entities) to generate 
voluntary cooperation and compliance from citizens is through procedural justice (or 
procedural fairness)—that is, quality treatment and quality decision making during 
interactions with citizens. Procedural justice enhances the legitimacy of authorities in the 
eyes of the public, thereby increasing the likelihood that citizens cooperate (e.g., report 
criminal activity) and comply with legal authorities both in the immediate situation and 
long-term. Tyler and Huo (2002) later demonstrated that Whites, African Americans, and 
Hispanics all place equal importance on the fairness of police and court procedures. This 
is a significant finding given the historical tension between police and minority groups. 
Based on their findings and a host of additional empirical research in support of the 
procedural justice-legitimacy link, Tyler and Huo advocate for what they call the 




procedurally fair manner during interactions with citizens, the police can increase the 
likelihood that they are met with cooperation and compliance rather than resistance and 
contempt. By extension, process-based policing reduces the frequency with which the 
police must resort to coercive force as a means of obtaining compliance during 
interactions. 
The problem is that until recently, scholars have failed to consider what the police 
believe underscores their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. According to Bottoms and 
Tankebe (2012), legitimacy is a dialogue that involves power holders and audiences. If 
the police do not understand that citizens associate their legitimacy with the fairness of 
procedures used by officers, then process-based regulation is less likely to come to 
fruition. For example, it is conceivable that the police might believe that citizens are more 
concerned with their effectiveness in fighting crime than with procedural justice. Recent 
research suggests this is precisely the case among Israeli National Police commanding 
officers (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014). To date, no research using the dialogic 
approach to understand legitimacy has been conducted in the United States. The present 
study addresses this gap by surveying a nationally representative stratified sample of law 
enforcement executives about how they believe citizens evaluate their agency and its 
officers. In addition to replicating Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz (2014), the present study 







Tyler (1990) argues that people comply with the law and authority figures such as 
the police due to instrumental and normative concerns. Instrumental concerns include 
performance of the police, risk/deterrence, and distributive justice. Normative concerns 
include personal obedience (i.e., a person’s general beliefs about how he/she should 
behave) and legitimacy (i.e., their perception of whether the police have just authority 
over them) (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Historically, the criminal justice system has been 
dominated by deterrence theory—the idea that compliance with the law is gained through 
the perceived risk of being caught and punished for criminal behavior (Blumstein, Cohen, 
& Nagin, 1978; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). For example, Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) 
theory of broken windows suggests that the most effective way to reduce crime is through 
order maintenance. By cracking down on incivilities and less serious forms of crime, the 
police can deter potential offenders from committing crime in the long term (i.e., their 
compliance with the law would increase). Judges issue sentences that are intended, in 
part, to outweigh the benefits of the offense committed in order to deter individuals from 
future offending. Yet Tyler’s (1990) findings suggest that people obey the law more so 
because they believe it is legitimate than because of instrumental concerns regarding 
police effectiveness or the fear of being punished. That is, normative concerns play a 




In its broadest sense, legitimacy concerns the right of a power-holder to rule and 
the degree to which the ruled acknowledge said right (Beetham, 1991; Bottoms & 
Tankebe, 2012; Coicaud, 2002). As it pertains to legal authorities like the police, 
“legitimacy reflects people’s views about the degree to which they feel a responsibility to 
support legal authorities and defer to their decisions” (Tyler & Huo, 2002, p. 101). 
Establishing legitimacy is thus crucial to the police because it increases the likelihood of 
deference from the community. When they are viewed as a legitimate authority, the 
police are less likely to have to use coercive force against citizens. According to Tom 
Tyler’s theory of procedural justice, the police can enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public by exercising their authority in a procedurally fair manner (Tyler, 1990, 2004; 
Tyler & Huo, 2002). 
Establishing legitimacy in the eyes of the public is an important goal for the 
police, who are empowered by the public to uphold the law. Because the police cannot be 
everywhere at once, they rely heavily on voluntary compliance with the law in order to 
maintain social order. Moreover, even when directly interacting with citizens, police 
cannot be sure that they will always receive deference. For example, Mastrofski, Snipes, 
and Supina (1996) observed police-citizen encounters in Richmond, Virginia and found 
an overall noncompliance rate of 22 percent. When citizens view the police as a 
legitimate authority, they are more likely to obey the law and cooperate with police by 
reporting crimes and informally enforcing societal norms. Compliance and cooperation 
are essential to the crime suppression function of the police. More important, citizens are 
more likely to comply with police decisions in the long term when they perceive the 




The Process-Based Model 
 Legitimacy has enjoyed a great deal of attention in the field of criminology during 
recent years. Current research in this area has been dominated by Tom Tyler’s (1990) 
theory of procedural justice, which he developed based on the work of Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) and Leventhal (1980). Thibaut and Walker’s framework suggests that 
people are concerned with controlling processes and outcomes. Their findings revealed 
that during disputes, litigants were not directly concerned with receiving favorable 
outcomes, but rather their ability to influence third-party decisions. Ability to influence 
decision making procedures in turn shaped their satisfaction with outcomes regardless of 
whether said outcomes negatively influenced the individuals (e.g., losing the decision). 
Leventhal (1980) identified six criteria used by citizens to judge the fairness of 
legal procedures. First, citizens believe that legal procedures should be applied 
consistently across individuals and over time. Second, procedures should be applied 
objectively (i.e., bias-suppression). Third, procedures should be based on accurate 
information and informed opinion. Fourth, procedures must be in place that allow for 
erroneous decisions to be reversed (i.e., correctability). Fifth, procedures should be 
representative by reflecting the concerns and values of various subgroups within the 
population affected by said procedures. Finally, individuals all have their own moral 
compass and, as such, they may judge the fairness of procedures in terms of how well it 
aligns with their moral and ethical values (i.e., ethicality).  
Tyler (1990) combined these two frameworks in his study which focused on 
citizens’ views about the legitimacy of legal authorities and the law more generally. 




demonstrated that legitimacy (conceptualized as perceived obligation to obey the police 
and institutional trust/support for the police) had an independent influence on compliance 
regardless of age, sex, race, income or education. Second, he established that citizens’ 
evaluations of police legitimacy are not based on instrumental concerns over being 
caught and punished for breaking the law, but instead on normative concerns regarding 
the fairness of procedures. Finally, he explored the manner in which citizens evaluate 
procedural justice and found that they focus on seven noninstrumental aspects of 
interactions: “the authorities’ motivation, honesty, bias, and ethicality; their opportunities 
for representation; the quality of the decisions; and the opportunity for correcting errors” 
(p. 137). His findings support earlier research which suggests people value the 
opportunity to plead their case to authorities even when they do not think they can sway 
the authority and influence their outcome (see Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). 
One key limitation of Tyler’s Chicago study was that it did not measure 
immediate decision acceptance (i.e., compliance and deference during personal 
encounters with the police). Later research by Tyler and Huo (2002) addressed this issue 
by interviewing 1,656 Oakland and Los Angeles residents who had personal interactions 
with police officers and judges. The authors oversampled minority residents in order to 
compare their experiences to the experiences of white residents. Findings revealed that 
procedural justice during interactions with police/court officials influenced citizens’ 
willingness to accept decisions and was the primary factor that citizens used to evaluate 
such authorities. And although general attitudes toward the police have previously been 
shown to vary by race (e.g., satisfaction; see Engel, 2005; Wu, Sun, & Triplett, 2009), 




fairness in Tyler and Huo’s study. The authors conclude that establishing legitimacy 
through procedural justice is a more efficient and effective means of regulating society 
than relying solely on deterrence. This strategy of “process-based regulation” (p. 204) is 
advantageous to the police because it not only increases compliance during specific 
interactions with the public, but it also increases long-term compliance and cooperation. 
The key to the process-based model of regulation is that the police (and courts) 
must exercise their authority in a procedurally just fashion. There are three components 
of procedural justice: quality of decision making, quality of interpersonal treatment, and 
motive-based trust (Tyler & Lind, 1992). Quality of decision-making includes allowing 
people to express their concerns before making a decision that ultimately affects them 
and neutrality, competence, and consistency on the part of the decision maker. According 
to Tyler (2004, p. 94), “because people are seldom in a position to know what the correct 
or reasonable outcome is, they focus on evidence that the decision-making procedures by 
which outcomes are arrived at show evidence of fairness.” Quality of interpersonal 
treatment involves treating individuals with dignity and respect, acknowledging their 
rights, and considering their needs. Tyler argues that quality treatment reaffirms one’s 
social status and sense of self-worth, which is extremely important during an interaction 
which can be demeaning to the citizen. Finally, motive based trust refers to “inferences 
about the intentions behind actions, intentions that flow from a person’s unobservable 
motivations and character” (Tyler & Huo, 2002, p. 61). Citizens therefore trust a police 
officer when they believe the officer’s motives are pure and he/she has the citizen’s needs 




These three elements—quality of decision-making, quality of treatment, and 
motive-based trust—constitute procedural fairness which in turn increases the perceived 
legitimacy of the police among citizens (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Huo, 
2002). However, Tyler and Blader (2000) included motive-based trust as an aspect of 
quality of treatment, which together with quality of decision making shape individuals’ 
procedural justice judgments. Subsequent procedural justice research has followed this 
lead by largely focusing on quality of decision making and quality of interpersonal 
treatment as the primary components of procedural fairness (Gau, 2011; Murphy, Tyler, 
& Curtis, 2009; Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz, 2007). Numerous studies have demonstrated 
that procedural justice is the primary antecedent of evaluations of police legitimacy net of 
other factors (Gau, 2011, 2013; Gau, Corsaro, Stewart, & Brunson, 2012; Reisig et al., 
2007; Tankebe, 2013; Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Wolfe, 2011; Wolfe, Nix, 
Kaminski, & Rojek, 2015). That is, individuals who believe police actions are 
procedurally fair are more likely to perceive them as a legitimate authority. 
When citizens perceive the police as a legitimate authority, they are more likely to 
cooperate with them by reporting crimes and informally enforcing societal norms. In 
addition, legitimacy yields greater compliance both in the immediate situation (i.e., 
during a police-citizen interaction) and in the long-term. The appeal of the process-based 
model is that it generates voluntary cooperation and compliance. This in turn is believed 
to decrease the frequency with which the police have to resort to coercive force because 
people will become self-regulating (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Relying on the public to self-
regulate themselves because they feel they ought to appears to be a much more effective 




This self-regulatory ability stems from normative evaluations of legal authority 
legitimacy that do not necessitate the presence of law enforcement or threat of 
punishment to achieve compliance with the law.  
 Aside from Tyler’s research, subsequent studies have largely focused on 
procedural justice and other potential antecedents of police legitimacy. Those studies that 
have examined the outcomes of legitimacy have yielded results that support the process-
based model. Individuals who perceive the police as legitimate are more likely to comply 
with the law (Jackson, Bradford, Stanko, & Hohl, 2012a; Murphy et al., 2009; 
Papachristos, Meares, & Fagan, 2012; Reisig, Tankebe, & Meško, 2014a; Reisig, Wolfe, 
& Holtfreter, 2011; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). For example, Reisig et al. (2011) used 
cross-sectional survey data to demonstrate that police legitimacy was associated with 
greater compliance. The correlation between police legitimacy and cooperation has also 
received empirical support (Jackson et al., 2012a; Murphy & Cherney, 2012; Murphy, 
Hinds, & Fleming, 2008; Reisig, Tankebe, & Meško, 2014b). For instance, using face-to-
face interview data from the London Metropolitan Police’s Public Attitudes Survey 
(METPAS), Jackson et al. (2012a) found that police legitimacy was correlated with 
greater cooperation. However, among a Ghanaian sample, Tankebe (2009) found that 
citizen cooperation was influenced more by perceived effectiveness of the police than 
perceived legitimacy. 
Competing Antecedents of Legitimacy 
 Distributive justice. Tyler (1990, 2003) suggests that police legitimacy can be 
influenced by both normative and instrumental concerns. In contrast to procedural justice, 




instrumental perspective that focuses on fairness of outcomes (Sarat, 1977). In the 
organizational context, researchers have shown that distributive justice is associated with 
increased job satisfaction, more positive evaluations of supervisors, and trust in 
management (Alexander & Ruderman, 1987). As it applies to the police, citizens who 
believe that the police provide the same quality of service to all people tend to view them 
as a more legitimate authority (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Sarat (1977) contends that “the 
perception of unequal treatment is the single most important source of popular 
dissatisfaction with the American legal system” (p. 434). According to distributive justice 
theory, people are more willing to empower (and subsequently obey) legal authorities 
such as the police when they feel that outcomes are distributed fairly to them and to 
society more broadly. That is, citizens place importance on the extent to which the police 
provide the same quality of service and enforce the law consistently when dealing with 
all people (e.g., regardless of race or social status).  
Tyler and Wakslak (2004) used four studies to demonstrate that perceived racial 
profiling by the police was associated with lower levels of perceived legitimacy of the 
police. In the first study, phone interviews with 521 residents of Los Angeles and 
Oakland who had recently been stopped by the police revealed that those who attributed 
their experience to profiling expressed less willingness to accept police decisions. 
Structural equation modeling (SEM) revealed that perceived distributive fairness (e.g., 
“The outcome I received was fair” and “I received the outcome I deserved according to 
the law”) on the part of the officer was associated with reduced profiling attributions (b = 
-.23). However, two elements of procedural justice—quality of interpersonal treatment (b 




attributions, which in turn increased willingness to accept police decisions. In the second 
study, which involved phone interviews with 721 New York City (NYC) residents 
between the ages of 18 and 26, those who felt profiling was widespread (b = -.35), was 
not justified (b = -.18), or had personally experienced police profiling (b = -.15) were less 
supportive of the police. The third study involved a random mail sample of 586 registered 
voters in NYC and revealed that although distributive justice was associated with 
increased support for the police among both whites (b = .28) and nonwhites (b = .16), 
quality of decision making (b = .53 for whites and .69 for nonwhites) and quality of 
treatment (b = .63 for whites and .68 for nonwhites) were much more important in terms 
of fostering support. Further, quality of decision making and quality of treatment each 
directly reduced perceptions of profiling while distributive justice did not. The fourth 
study used a stratified sample of 1,653 NYC residents and demonstrated that distributive 
justice was associated with greater perceived legitimacy of police (measured using a 17-
item scale that included measures of perceived obligation to obey the police and 
trust/confidence in the institution of policing) and performance in fighting crime (e.g., 
“When people call the police for help, how quickly do they respond” and “How effective 
are the police in fighting crime in your neighborhood”) for both whites (b = .44) and 
nonwhites (b = .15). In this instance distributive justice outperformed measures of 
procedural justice in terms of predicting legitimacy among white respondents but not 
nonwhite respondents. Among nonwhites, quality of decision making (b = .39), quality of 
interpersonal treatment (b = .44), and trust (b = .18) all exerted a stronger influence on 
legitimacy. Collectively, an important takeaway from these four studies is that while 




support, willingness to accept decisions, performance), it appears less important than 
procedural justice (see also, Hinds & Murphy, 2007; Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & 
Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1990, 2005; Tyler & Huo, 2002).  
 Police performance. Another potential predictor of police legitimacy focuses on 
performance—the effectiveness of the police in fighting crime and disorder in the 
community (Tyler, 2005; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). While performance has been linked 
to legitimacy, procedural fairness tends to matter more to citizens (Jackson et al., 2012a; 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Wolfe et al., 2015). Yet the evidence is more mixed than that 
stemming from research comparing the effects of procedural and distributive fairness. For 
example, Sunshine and Tyler found that the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy was 
about five times greater than the effect of a police performance scale. Likewise, Wolfe et 
al. (2015) found that procedural justice had a stronger effect on respondents’ obligation to 
obey and trust in the police than performance. However, recent studies performed outside 
of the U.S. indicate that performance might matter more to citizens than the use of fair 
procedures. Data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey reveal that, among 
South Africans, police performance and crime in the community have a stronger effect on 
perceived legitimacy of the police (i.e., duty to obey and moral alignment with police) 
than procedural fairness (Bradford, Huq, Jackson, & Roberts, 2014). In a related fashion, 
scholars have demonstrated that effectiveness is more important in terms of generating 
cooperation (one of the ultimate outcomes of the process-based model) than procedural 
justice outside of the U.S. Tankebe (2009) found that Ghanaians’ cooperation with police 




Sargeant, Murphy, and Cherney (2013) reached a similar conclusion about Vietnamese 
individuals using the Australian Community Capacity Survey.  
On the other hand, Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd (2013) used a natural 
experiment to demonstrate that even in the face of threats to national security, procedural 
justice outperformed police performance in terms of its effect on Israeli citizens’ 
perceptions of police legitimacy. While residents of Sderot (a small city near the Gaza 
Strip that had recently experienced more missile threats and attacks than any other 
community in Israel) were more concerned with police performance (b = .61) than 
residents in comparison communities (b = .39), they were almost equally concerned with 
procedural fairness (Sderot b = .51, control b = .58; the difference is not statistically 
significant). The evidence is therefore mixed and more research is needed that directly 
compares the effects of procedural justice and performance on legitimacy. 
Empirical Issues Concerning the Process-Based Model 
 Much of the literature reviewed up to this point has been concerned with (a) 
whether legitimacy is associated with increased cooperation and compliance, and (b) 
what the strongest predictor of legitimacy is. In the sections that follow, two important 
empirical issues will be considered: the measurement of procedural justice and 
legitimacy, and the generality of the process-based model. In order for research 
pertaining to police legitimacy to have any sort of practical implications, it is critical for 
scholars to reach an agreement about what exactly legitimacy is. Likewise, testing the 
generality of the process-based model is important because it sheds light on how 
applicable the model is in different contexts. The more general the model is, the greater 





Legitimacy. There has been considerable debate regarding the best way to 
measure legitimacy. Tyler (1990, 2003) conceptualizes legitimacy as trust and perceived 
obligation to obey, but scholars have since demonstrated that the two concepts do not 
load together onto a single factor (Gau, 2011, 2013; Reisig et al., 2007). For example, 
upon disaggregating Tyler’s legitimacy index, Reisig et al. (2007) found that trust in the 
police influenced compliance and cooperation but obligation to obey did not. Hawdon 
(2008) points out that it is entirely possible for citizens to view the police as a legitimate 
institution without necessarily trusting certain officers. In his words, “the role is 
legitimate; the individual is trusted” (p. 186). Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, p. 164) note 
that legitimacy and trust are not conceptually identical—while legitimacy is “a concept 
focused on the present,” trust tends to be future-oriented. Recent research has therefore 
treated trust as both theoretically and empirically distinct from legitimacy (e.g., Nix, 
Wolfe, Rojek, & Kaminski, 2014; Sargeant, Murphy, & Cherney, 2013). 
According to Beetham (1991), an authority is legitimate when “it conforms to 
established rules, the rules are morally justifiable and there is evidence of consent by the 
subordinate to the particular power relation” (p. 16, emphasis added). In other words, 
legitimacy hinges in part on the degree to which the police and the public share common 
beliefs about the maintenance of social order. Jackson et al. (2012b) therefore define 
legitimacy as a sense of moral alignment with the police in addition to a perceived 
obligation to obey (see also Jackson et al., 2012a). Jackson and his colleagues measure 
moral alignment using three items: “the police usually act in ways that are consistent with 




decisions that are right for the people in this neighbourhood,” and “my own feelings 
about what is right and wrong usually agree with the law.” In later conceptualization, 
Jackson et al. (2012a, 2013a) treat legitimacy as being comprised of three sub-
components: obligation to obey, moral alignment, and legality (i.e., acting in accordance 
with the law; see also Beetham, 1991; Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 
2010; Jackson, Huq, Bradford, & Tyler, 2013b).  
Tyler (2003, p. 310) argues that “perceived obligation to obey is the most direct 
extension of the concept of legitimacy.” Bottoms and Tankebe (2012), however, submit 
that citizens can feel obligated to obey the law or legal authorities for reasons other than 
perceived legitimacy. Deterrence theory, for example, suggests that rational citizens feel 
obligated to obey the law because they fear being punished—regardless of whether or not 
they perceive it as legitimate (Becker, 1968; Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Or perhaps 
citizens obey legal authorities out of “dull compulsion,” which Carrabine (2004, p. 180) 
suggests occurs with inmates in the prison context (i.e., they are powerless to do anything 
else but obey the authorities). Drawing upon the writings of Beetham (1991) and Coicaud 
(2002), Tankebe (2013) uses data from 5,120 interviews with London residents to 
demonstrate that legitimacy is comprised of four dimensions and exerts a direct effect on 
citizens’ willingness to cooperate with the police independent of perceived obligation to 
obey. These four dimensions are procedural justice (e.g., “The police use rules and 
procedures that are fair to everyone”), distributive justice (e.g., “People usually receive 
the outcomes they deserve under the law”), lawfulness (e.g., “The law represents the 
moral values of people like me”), and effectiveness (measured by asking respondents how 




also has an indirect influence on cooperation that operates through perceived obligation 
to obey. Thus, lawfulness (or moral alignment) has recently emerged as an important 
concept in legitimacy research. Tankebe’s research also suggests that concepts scholars 
have typically treated as predictors of police legitimacy (i.e., procedural justice, 
distributive justice, and effectiveness) are actually components of legitimacy.  
Procedural justice. Much like the debate surrounding the proper way to 
conceptualize and operationalize legitimacy, researchers have measured procedural 
justice in a variety of ways. It is typically measured using questions that tap either 
individuals’ global or specific attitudes toward police. Global procedural justice refers to 
assessments of the police in general. Specific procedural justice on the other hand refers 
to evaluations of how officers conduct themselves during particular police-citizen 
interactions. While global attitudes can be influenced by personal and vicarious 
experiences (e.g., media coverage or hearing about a friend’s interaction with the police), 
specific attitudes develop based on a face-to-face interaction with police. Gau (2013) 
demonstrated that both specific (e.g., “The officer treated me with respect” and “The 
officer took the time to listen to what I had to say”) and global indicators of procedural 
justice (e.g., “The police treat people with respect” and “The police take the time to listen 
to people”) predict legitimacy perceptions, but that global predictors exert a stronger 
influence on perceived legitimacy. Furthermore, global attitudes appear to remain stable 
over time and isolated interactions tend not to affect them strongly. Using a panel design, 
Tyler (1990) found that prior attitudes toward police (i.e., global attitudes) were key 
predictors of procedural justice and legitimacy, but perceived procedural justice during 




Findings from the Queensland Community Engagement Trial (QCET) support the 
notion that specific interactions can influence people’s satisfaction with the police, 
perceived global procedural justice, legitimacy, willingness to cooperate, and future 
compliant behavior (Mazerolle, Bennett, Antrobus, & Eggins, 2012; Mazerolle, 
Antrobus, Bennett, & Tyler, 2013). The QCET involved a randomized field experiment, 
whereby sixty “Random Breath Testing” (RBT) checkpoints were assigned to receive 
control (i.e., business-as-usual) or treatment conditions during which the officers 
conducted themselves in a procedurally fair manner (i.e., they read from scripts that 
highlighted neutrality, trustworthiness, citizen participation, and treating the citizens with 
dignity and respect). Drivers in both groups then received surveys that inquired about 
their attitudes toward driving under the influence, satisfaction with the police (i.e., “I was 
satisfied with the way the officer conducted the RBT”), and compliance (i.e., “I did as I 
was told by the officer”). Of the 20,985 surveys distributed, 2,762 were returned for a 
13.2 percent response rate. Mazerolle et al. (2012) revealed that drivers in the treatment 
group were more likely to comply and indicated being more satisfied with police than 
drivers in the control group. Later, Mazerolle et al. (2013) used structural equation 
modeling to demonstrate that perceived procedural justice on the part of officers during 
RBTs was associated with greater perceived legitimacy (operationalized as obligation to 
obey, e.g., “I feel a moral obligation to obey police”; moral alignment, e.g., “My own 
feelings about what is right and wrong usually agree with the rules and laws enforced by 
police”; and disengagement from the police, e.g., “I do not care if I am not doing the right 




that a respondent would call the police to report a crime or report dangerous/suspicious 
activity to the police). 
Though an important topic certainly worthy of empirical consideration, the 
present study is not explicitly focused on such measurement issues. The purpose of 
discussing it here is to accurately depict the current body of knowledge pertaining to 
procedural justice theory. It should be clear that scholars have yet to agree on the best 
way to operationalize procedural justice and legitimacy. As Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) 
put it, “the concept of legitimacy is elusive and multifaceted” (p. 168). Yet regardless of 
how various researchers have elected to measure the two concepts, procedural justice and 
legitimacy are consistently revealed to be positively correlated with one another. That is, 
greater procedural justice tends to be associated with greater perceived legitimacy of the 
police.  
Generality 
Another important debate surrounding procedural justice theory is the extent to 
which it can be labeled a “general” theory. That is, does it operate in the same manner for 
all people, regardless of individual or situational differences? According to Tyler (1990): 
Another important issue is the degree to which the meaning of procedural justice 
is universal—the extent to which the fairness of procedures is always judged 
against the same criteria. Two extreme positions might be imagined. One would 
have stable criteria, with people always judging the fairness of procedures the 
same way…the other would emphasize the relationship between the 
characteristics of the respondent, or of his or her recent personal experience, and 
the criteria used to evaluate the fairness of the procedures” (p. 121, emphasis 
added). 
Tyler suggests six demographic variables which might influence one’s interpretation of 




vein, it is conceivable that a number of variables might confound or moderate the 
relationship between procedural justice and perceived legitimacy of the police (e.g., 
neighborhood context). Thus, Jackson and colleagues (2012a, p. 197) pose the question: 
“Does the procedural justice model work differently for different social groups or in 
different neighbourhood contexts?” That is, is the effect of procedural justice on 
legitimacy invariant?  
Much of the procedural justice oriented research to date has been conducted using 
general population surveys and has typically only been concerned with minor forms of 
law-breaking. However, scholars have used a variety of different samples to examine the 
relationship between procedural justice and citizens’ evaluations of the police, which has 
in turn extended the generality of the process-based model. For example, Paternoster, 
Brame, Bachman, and Sherman (1997) reanalyzed data from the Milwaukee Domestic 
Violence Experiment and found that procedural fairness on the part of officers called to 
the scene of domestic assaults resulted in fewer future assaults by the offenders. 
Papachristos et al. (2012) used data from the Chicago Gun Project (CGP), a survey of 
141 known gang offenders, and found that CGP offenders were more likely to comply 
with the law when they believed in the legitimacy of the law and the police. These 
authors were interested in compliance and perceived police legitimacy among active, 
violent offenders (i.e., those individuals in the community who are most likely to commit 
serious crimes) as opposed to the normal, mostly law-abiding citizens who typically 
complete general population surveys (e.g., Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002). Their 
findings suggest that the process-based model can be just as effective at promoting 




 Research demonstrates that the effect of procedural justice on perceived 
legitimacy of the police is typically invariant across age, gender, political alignment, 
income, education, and moral values (Jackson et al., 2012a; Napier & Tyler, 2008; Tyler, 
1988, 1994, 2000; Wolfe et al., 2015). The procedural justice-legitimacy link also 
appears to be invariant across neighborhood context (Gau et al., 2012; Jackson et al., 
2012a; Wolfe et al., 2015) and past experiences (Jackson et al., 2012a; Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004), and seems to operate in the same manner both inside and 
outside of the U.S. (Jackson et al., 2012a; Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013; Mazerolle 
et al., 2012, 2013; Murphy et al., 2009; Reisig, Tankebe, & Meško, 2014a, b; Tankebe, 
2008). There are, however, some notable exceptions. Tyler (2005) found that quality of 
treatment was significantly correlated with trust in the police among African Americans 
and Hispanics, but not Whites. Similarly, Tyler and Wakslak (2004) discovered that 
distributive justice had a stronger effect on perceived legitimacy than procedural justice 
among whites, but among nonwhites, procedural justice outperformed distributive justice. 
Gau et al. (2012) demonstrated that the effect of concentrated disadvantage on perceived 
legitimacy of the police remained significant even after controlling for procedural justice. 
Findings such as this suggest that neighborhood context may exert an important influence 
on legitimacy that cannot be counteracted by procedural fairness on the part of police 
officers. However, Wolfe et al. (2015) found that the effect of procedural justice on 
obligation to obey the police and trust in the police did not vary according to individual 
differences in perceived collective efficacy or disorder, but that the effect of procedural 
justice on trust did vary slightly according to prior victimization. In their study, the 




victims. This suggests it is perhaps even more crucial that the police use fair procedures 
when interacting with crime victims. On the other hand, Jackson et al. (2012a) found that 
the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy was invariant across prior victimization as 
well as neighborhood context, age, gender, ethnicity, or having been stopped by the 
police in the previous 12 months. The effect of procedural fairness on trust in the police, 
however, was stronger for those with greater levels of fear of crime and disorder. This 
suggests that process-based policing is even more crucial when the police interact with 
fearful citizens.   
Also at the individual level, Piquero, Gomez-Smith, and Langton (2004) showed 
that low levels of self-control conditioned individuals’ perceptions of procedural fairness 
(i.e., those with low self-control were more likely to perceive sanctions as unfair), and 
Wolfe (2011) discovered that low self-control weakened the effect of procedural justice 
on perceived legitimacy. People with low self-control are impulsive, shortsighted, and 
insensitive to others (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). In the case of a police-citizen 
interaction, they would be more concerned with immediate gratification (i.e., a favorable 
outcome) than long term benefits (i.e., an increasingly self-regulatory society achieved 
through procedural justice). As such, the process-based model may not be as effective at 
generating compliance and legitimacy among those with low self-control. However, 
Reisig et al. (2011) found that legitimacy exerted a direct effect on citizens’ compliance 
with the law independent of variations in self-control. The results of this limited body of 
research are inconsistent, but more importantly, aside from Jackson et al. (2012a) and 
Wolfe et al. (2015), these studies only implicitly test the invariance of procedural justice 




is not enough research to date that specifically tests the invariance of procedural justice 
theory to reach definitive conclusions regarding the framework’s overall generality.  
Implications 
 The policy implications of Tyler and Huo’s (2002) process-based model are 
extensive. Above all else, people want to be treated fairly and they want to be treated 
with respect. And while minority groups tend to have lower levels of satisfaction with 
(Engel, 2005; Wu, Sun, & Triplett, 2009) or trust in police (Hindelang, 1974; Tyler, 
2005), procedural justice remains the primary antecedent of perceived legitimacy 
regardless of citizen race (Tyler & Huo, 2002; Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). Of particular 
interest to the police is that they can potentially override the negative emotions that arise 
from an undesirable outcome such as a speeding ticket or arrest so long as the procedures 
used by officers are deemed fair by citizens. Negative experiences appear to influence 
peoples’ attitudes toward police more strongly than positive experiences (Brandl, Frank, 
Worden, & Bynum, 1994; Rosenbaum, Schuck, Costello, Hawkins, & Ring, 2005), thus 
making procedural fairness all the more important during police-citizen interactions that 
often result in undesirable outcomes for the citizen. 
Even when citizens question the legitimacy of a particular law, they still tend to 
comply so long as police behave in a procedurally fair manner. Upon surveying 2,120 
Australian citizens in 2007, Murphy et al. (2009) found that procedural justice was even 
more important in terms of generating compliance among individuals who question the 
legitimacy of the law (e.g., “My feelings about what is right and wrong are usually 
consistent with the laws enforced by the police”) compared to those who believe the law 




procedurally fair manner, they could reap the long term benefits of self-regulation on the 
part of the public. That is, citizens will voluntarily comply with the law and cooperate 
with police by reporting crime and informally enforcing social norms. This is an 
especially desirable outcome for the police given that, as Sunshine and Tyler (2003, pp. 
535-36) point out, “[T]he police have more control over how they treat people than they 
do over the crime rate.” Crime will always fluctuate due, at least in part, to factors the 
police cannot control. The police can however control the way they treat people. 
 The police are faced with the difficult task of enforcing the law, which oftentimes 
means they must distribute undesirable outcomes to members of the public. But what if a 
citizen elects not to comply with an officer’s directives—or worse, if he/she becomes 
physically combative? Currently, the police are equipped with firearms, conductive 
energy devices (e.g., TASERs), and/or batons as a form of coercive force intended to 
promote compliance. These weapons serve as manifestations of deterrence theory. Yet 
solely relying on the threat of force is dangerous for citizens and the police alike. For 
example, Hutson et al. (2009) analyzed data from a random mail survey of 315 
emergency physicians and found that 99.8 percent of them believe that excessive force by 
the police occurs. In addition, 97.8 percent of responding physicians indicated that they 
had managed patients whom they suspected had been the victims of excessive force by 
the police. On the flipside, injuries to officers also occur: Alpert and Dunham (2004) 
found that 38 percent of Miami-Dade police officers and 25 percent of Baltimore County 
(Maryland) police officers indicated they had been injured during use-of-force incidents. 
The appeal of the process-based model is that it can potentially generate increased 




make society a safer place for both citizens and the police. However, establishing 
legitimacy is not intended to replace the need for officers to carry weapons. Policing 
remains a dangerous job and there will likely always be situations that require the use of 
force. The process-based model does however hold promise in that it can potentially 
reduce the frequency with which these types of situations occur.  
The Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy 
 Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) recently proposed that researchers adopt what they 
call the “dialogic” approach to understanding legitimacy. According to the authors, 
legitimacy involves two parties: power holders and audiences. In order to truly 
understand legitimacy, researchers must think of it as an ongoing dialogue between these 
two parties. In the case of the police and the community, the police are the power-holders 
and the community is the audience. According to Bottoms and Tankebe, power-holders 
(i.e., the police) first make a claim to legitimacy. The audience then responds—either 
positively or negatively—to that claim. Power holders, in turn, observe the audience’s 
response to their claim to legitimacy and may or may not choose to alter it as a result. 
In order to understand what is meant by a “claim to legitimacy,” it is helpful to 
differentiate between the various types of power holders. Joseph Raz (2009) suggests 
there are three types: (1) people or groups who exert naked power, (2) de facto 
authorities, and (3) legitimate authorities. An example of the first group would be hostage 
takers—they do not claim any right to rule nor do they suggest those under their control 
are morally obligated to obey. Rather, they use fear and/or physical coercion to gain 
obedience. The second group—de facto authorities—make a claim to legitimacy, but 




right to exercise power over their audience(s), who in turn recognize and accept that 
claim (see also Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012, pp. 125-126). 
How then, do the police make a claim to legitimacy? Steve Herbert (2006) 
submits there are three ways in which the police may establish and enhance their 
legitimacy. First and foremost, they must serve their audience’s (i.e., the citizens in their 
jurisdiction) needs.1 Second, they must separate themselves from the public for two 
reasons: to uphold societal values and to maintain esprit de corps (which can serve to 
enhance performance). Finally, Herbert suggests that to make a fully legitimate claim to 
authority, the police must be proactive. That is, the police should take initiative in 
maintaining social order rather than reacting to crime and disorder as it occurs. These 
three notions—subservience, separation, and generativity—are the key to making a 
successful claim to police legitimacy according to Herbert.  
 Until the development of the dialogic model, scholars largely failed to consider 
one of the parties involved in the legitimacy dialogue: the police. The vast majority of 
studies that ensued in response to Tyler’s theory have been concerned with audience (i.e., 
citizen) perceptions of legitimacy. A crucial starting point for scholars seeking to apply 
the dialogic approach to legitimacy research is to develop a better understanding of how 
the police perceive their own legitimacy which can be referred to as “self-legitimacy.” 
Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) pose the following question: “What importance do officers 
assign the manner in which they exercise their authority, the ends that particular practices 
are designed to achieve and their relationship to community values, and so on?” (p. 162, 
                                                          
1 This does not imply that everyone in the community will have the same needs. Thus, as Bottoms and 
Tankebe (2012) suggest, power holders—especially the police—must consider their legitimacy in the eyes 




emphasis in original). Thus, it is important to ask the police what they believe makes 
their authority legitimate. What do individual officers believe gives them rightful 
authority over citizens? If the police make claims to legitimacy which are ultimately not 
in line with what the public needs, it is likely that the public will not recognize the police 
as legitimate. Thus, maybe even more fundamentally, police officers’ understanding of 
the foundations of their legitimacy in the eyes of the public needs to be assessed. This is 
crucial to the success of the process-based model of regulation. For the model to work, 
the police must understand that procedural fairness is the key to increasing long-term 
compliance and cooperation. Examining officers’ views of how the public evaluates them 
will shed light on the degree to which the process-based model is feasible in practice and 
can prove useful in the translation of citizen survey results into actionable police 
behaviors. 
In response to Bottoms and Tankebe’s arguments, Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz 
(2014) surveyed 290 Israeli police officers (142 commanding officers and 148 “up and 
coming” officers working on bachelor’s or master’s degrees) and discovered that they 
associated their legitimacy with crime suppression ability (i.e., performance) more so 
than with procedural fairness. In other words, the Israeli officers believed that citizens’ 
evaluations of their legitimacy are based more on how well they fight crime than on how 
fairly they treat members of the public. The authors used survey items that were similar 
to those previously used in citizen surveys regarding legitimacy (e.g., Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003; Tyler & Wakslak 2004; Reisig et al., 2007). Items were manipulated so that they 
reflected officers’ views of what the community thinks of them. Thus, “Police respect the 




the average Israeli citizen believes that the police respect the rights of citizens they come 
into contact with” (see Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014, p. 10). Within their multivariate 
regression equations, the authors found that officers believe Israeli citizens’ instrumental 
concerns regarding performance/deterrence (β = 0.39) are associated with their 
legitimacy more so than procedural justice (β = 0.29). If the police and the public cannot 
agree on the foundations of legitimacy, the process-based model is not likely to be 
exploited by the police. As Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz point out: 
If…the police have an inaccurate understanding of citizen priorities, they may 
choose to emphasize aggressive crime control at the expense of procedural 
fairness in their work and claims to legitimacy, which may ultimately weaken 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the public (p. 6). 
The findings are important because they are the first to explore such a question using the 
dialogic model of legitimacy and demonstrate the model’s utility in an Israeli context. To 
date we do not have any comparison studies and, more importantly, a number of 
unanswered research questions remain stemming from Bottoms and Tankebe’s arguments 
and Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz’s findings. Therefore, it is clearly important to apply the 
dialogic model to U.S. legitimacy research and move the literature forward by examining 
in further detail several key areas of inquiry that are discussed in the following sections. 
Do U.S. law enforcement officers also feel that the foundation of their legitimacy is based 
on how well they fight crime and to a lesser degree procedurally fair treatment of 
citizens? Further, are police officers’ beliefs concerning the antecedents of their own 





Potential Moderating Variables 
 In terms of audience views of legitimacy, scholars have considered a number of 
factors which might moderate the relationship between procedural justice and police 
legitimacy or legitimacy-based outcomes (i.e., cooperation). Some of the more notable 
variables that have been considered include neighborhood contextual variables (e.g., 
collective efficacy [Gau et al., 2012]), legal cynicism (Tyler & Huo, 2002), and 
deterrence perceptions (Reisig et al., 2007). The procedural justice-legitimacy link 
appears to be robust across such factors, but it does not necessarily follow that the same 
will be true among the police. It is therefore important for researchers to account for these 
variables as they begin exploring the dialogic approach to legitimacy. The potential 
moderating influence of neighborhood contextual variables (e.g., level of crime, 
perceived collective efficacy, and perceived disorder), perceived risk of apprehension 
(i.e., deterrence), and legal cynicism will be discussed as they pertain to the dialogic 
model below. 
 Neighborhood context. Research suggests that police behavior is not uniform 
across all walks of society. On the contrary, it appears that their behavior varies, in part, 
according to neighborhood context. Whyte (1943) observed that the police develop 
standards of behavior in different neighborhoods in response to incompatible social 
pressures. Bayley and Mendelsohn (1969) suggest that the police are more apt to use 
coercion and make arrests in high-crime areas, and Smith (1986) later demonstrated that 
the police are less likely to (a) stop suspicious persons and (b) file incident reports in 
neighborhoods with higher levels of crime. Smith found that those who do get stopped in 




more affluent neighborhoods—regardless of the crime committed, the race and demeanor 
of the suspect, or the victim’s preferences for filing charges. Klinger (1997) suggests that 
officers working in high-crime areas tend to be more cynical, view criminal behavior as 
more normal, view victims as less deserving of vigorous police attention, and have less 
time on their hands. As such, only more serious criminal offenses receive vigorous police 
attention in high-crime areas. In sum, neighborhood context influences the way the police 
exercise their authority. 
It is conceivable that neighborhood contextual variables might moderate the 
relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy. For example, citizens residing in 
high crime areas might expect the police to focus on a different set of priorities than those 
residing in low crime areas. While most studies have considered neighborhood contextual 
variables as mediating variables (e.g., Gau et al., 2012; Nix et al., 2014), it is important to 
consider whether the police believe such variables moderate the strength of the 
procedural justice-legitimacy relationship, given that research suggests neighborhood 
context is a real concern among the police (Bayley & Mendelsohn, 1969; Klinger, 1997; 
Smith, 1986; Whyte, 1943). It bears repeating that regardless of what citizens truly 
believe, what is important in terms of the dialogic approach to legitimacy is what the 
police think citizens believe. Each of three components of neighborhood context—level 
of crime (i.e., high or low), perceived collective efficacy, and perceived disorder—will be 
considered here as they might apply to the dialogic model. 
 High vs. low crime areas. Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) suggest that the police 
must often consider their legitimacy in relation to multiple audiences—specifically when 




individuals’ perceptions of police legitimacy might vary according to the level of 
perceived danger or threat of victimization in an area. Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd 
(2013), for example, demonstrated that Israeli citizens living in areas that experienced 
more frequent security threats were more concerned with the performance of the police 
than their counterparts living in areas that experienced fewer security threats. Still, 
procedural justice was the primary antecedent of legitimacy in both areas. A distinct but 
related question that remains under-explored is whether or not police legitimacy is 
partially contingent upon the level of crime in an area. Perhaps, like citizens living in 
areas facing security threats, those residing in high crime areas are more concerned with 
police performance than citizens residing in low crime areas. Wolfe et al. (2015) address 
this question by interacting citizen perceptions of police performance with a dummy 
variable indicating whether the citizen lived in a “low crime neighborhood.” The 
interaction term failed to achieve statistical significance, meaning that in their sample, 
level of crime did not condition citizens’ perceptions of police performance. In other 
words, citizens in the low crime neighborhood were not significantly more or less 
concerned with police performance than citizens residing in high crime neighborhoods. 
Still, in terms of the dialogic approach to legitimacy, it seems reasonable that the police 
might believe this to be the case. For that reason, Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz (2014, p. 
15) encourage researchers to “distinguish between different sectors of society when 
asking officers to evaluate their public image.” It is therefore important to test whether 
the police associate their legitimacy with different factors depending on the specific 
audience (i.e., neighborhood) with whom they are dealing. Tyler (1990) suggests that 




differences such as level of crime in a neighborhood. Yet if the police do not believe this 
to be the case, they may fail to take advantage of process-based policing in certain areas 
of the community. 
Perceived collective efficacy. Perceived collective efficacy is another aspect of 
neighborhood context which might shape citizens’ normative evaluations of the police. 
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) define collective efficacy as “social cohesion 
among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common 
good” (p. 918). Gau et al. (2012) demonstrate that individuals’ perceptions of 
neighborhood social cohesion played a key role in their evaluations of police legitimacy. 
In fact, perceived social cohesion remained a significant correlate of perceived legitimacy 
even after accounting for procedural and distributive fairness. Nix et al. (2014) found that 
individuals who perceived lower levels of collective efficacy were less likely to view 
police actions as procedurally fair. Furthermore, perceived collective efficacy exerted a 
significant effect on trust in the police net of procedural justice. These findings have 
important implications for the dialogic approach to legitimacy. The authors suggest that a 
perceived lack of collective efficacy is essentially “an anomic cognitive orientation about 
one’s ecological environment,” which may ultimately result in cynical attitudes toward 
the police (p. 8). As such, those who perceive a lack of collective efficacy in their 
community might be less trusting of or feel less obligated to obey the police. In terms of 
the dialogic model of legitimacy, it remains to be seen whether the police believe 
collective efficacy is associated with their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
Accounting for perceived collective efficacy is thus essential as researchers begin moving 




 Perceived disorder. Another variable which might moderate the relationship 
between procedural justice and legitimacy is perceived disorder. The idea that the police 
consciously alter their behavior according to perceived disorder (Klinger, 1997) has 
important implications for the dialogic approach to legitimacy. It is conceivable that one 
of the reasons police officers alter their behavior in certain neighborhoods is that they 
might believe citizens’ views of the police partially hinge on peoples’ perception of the 
area in which they reside. For example, the police might believe performance in fighting 
crime is more important to citizens who believe there to be less disorder in their 
neighborhood while fair distribution of outcomes is more important to those who 
perceive greater disorder in their area of residence. Perhaps they believe that residents 
who perceive less disorder pay closer attention to crime trends and expect more from the 
police when crimes do occur. At the same time, it is conceivable that police officers 
might think those who perceive greater levels of disorder have come to accept it as a part 
of their everyday life. As such, they might feel that treating everyone equally is more 
important than performance in an area that everyone understands is plagued by crime and 
disorder. It is therefore important to consider whether officers believe citizens’ perceived 
levels of disorder are correlated with their evaluations of the police (i.e., legitimacy). 
 Perceived risk of apprehension. Given that the criminal justice system is 
predicated on the concept of deterrence—it is important to consider whether the police 
associate their legitimacy more so with their ability to create and sustain a credible risk of 
apprehension for law-breaking than with fair procedures. For example, part of the logic 
behind randomized “high visibility” patrol is that the police can deter would-be offenders 




(Bayley, 1994). As another example, the classic Minneapolis Domestic Violence 
Experiment found that men who committed misdemeanor assaults against their spouses 
were less likely to recidivate if they were arrested rather than counseled or separated 
(Sherman & Berk, 1984). As a result of this study, mandatory arrest laws were passed in 
jurisdictions across the country as a means of deterring domestic violence. Scholars have 
subsequently disputed the findings and called for the repeal of mandatory arrest policies 
(e.g., Sherman, 1992) but many jurisdictions still use them. Given practices such as these 
that are firmly rooted in deterrence theory, research is needed that considers whether the 
police associate their legitimacy more so with deterrence (i.e., perceived risk) than with 
procedural fairness. Simply put, the police may believe the public views them as a 
legitimate authority simply because they do a good job of deterring crime rather than 
maintaining procedural fairness during interactions with citizens. 
 Legal cynicism. In addition to the aforementioned variables, legal cynicism might 
moderate the effect of procedural justice on legitimacy. Tyler and Huo (2002) refer to 
legal cynicism as a view that the law is “an extension of the power of other groups or the 
state over them, rather than…rules created or enacted to advance their own interests” (p. 
105). Those who are cynical of the law (and by extension, legal authorities such as the 
police who are sworn to uphold the law) are thus less likely to feel obligated to obey the 
law. In other words, they view the law and legal authorities as less legitimate (Gau, 2014; 
Kirk & Papachristos, 2011) and less trustworthy (Carr, Napolitano, & Keating, 2007). It 
appears that levels of cynicism vary across neighborhoods. Sampson and Jeglum-
Bartusch (1998), for example, suggest that in neighborhoods characterized by disorder, 




to normative orientations—‘cognitive landscapes’ where crime and deviance are more or 
less expected and institutions of criminal justice are mistrusted” (p. 800). Residents living 
in neighborhoods such as these tend to be less satisfied with the police and more cynical 
of the law and the police than those living in more affluent areas.  
Recall that part of Klinger’s (1997) theory which suggests the police are less 
vigorous in high crime areas because they are cynical of residents in those areas. Their 
own cynicism thus shapes their behavior to a certain extent. It stands to reason that if 
police officers perceive residents of the community as being cynical toward the law and 
the police, they might also believe residents feel less obligated to obey their directives. 
After all, their own cynicism seems to make them less inclined to work diligently in high 
crime areas. In terms of the dialogic approach, it is important to consider the possibility 
that the police believe legal cynicism is as important or a potentially more powerful 
predictor of legitimacy than procedural justice in the eyes of the community. In other 
words, for police officers who view higher levels of citizen legal cynicism, procedural 
justice may not seem effective in terms of increasing their own legitimacy.  
The Current Study 
 In order to move the procedural justice and legitimacy literatures forward the 
present study uses the dialogic model proposed by Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) to 
explore how officers believe they are evaluated by the public in terms of legitimacy. A 
complete test of the model would require a longitudinal design that includes both officer 
and citizen surveys. Nevertheless, understanding how law enforcement executives feel 
they are judged by the public is an important step as it has been largely ignored up to this 
point by procedural justice research—the majority of studies have involved citizen 




U.S. sample, but research conducted in Israel suggests that police leaders associate their 
legitimacy more so with their agency’s effectiveness in reducing crime than with 
procedural fairness on the part of their officers (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014). Should 
the same finding emerge with the present sample, it would be an indication that the police 
cannot exploit the process-based model to their advantage as suggested by Tyler and Huo 
(2002) until they understand how the public evaluates them. An abundance of research 
suggesting that citizens view the police as a more legitimate authority when they are 
procedurally fair is of little value if the police themselves do not share the same beliefs 
regarding what makes them legitimate. 
 As a first step toward advancing the literature, the present study will replicate 
Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz’s (2014) work by comparing the effects of procedural justice 
and police performance on legitimacy in a U.S. law enforcement context. Beyond this 
initial inquiry, the present study adds to the limited literature on the dialogic model of 
legitimacy in several ways. Whereas Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz (2014) used only 
measures of trust, here both trust in the police and obligation to obey will be used to 
measure police legitimacy (Gau, 2011, 2013; Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; 
Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002). While scholars have recently questioned this two-
pronged operationalization of legitimacy (e.g., Bottoms & Tankebe, 2012; Jackson et al., 
2012b), the purpose of the current study is to compare how the police believe citizens 
evaluate their legitimacy within the current body of knowledge pertaining to citizens’ 
actual evaluations of police legitimacy. Because this is the first study to ask this question 
in the U.S., it is necessary to measure legitimacy the way it has predominantly been 




Distributive justice and performance will be considered in addition to procedural 
justice as potential antecedents of police legitimacy. A critical outcome of process-based 
policing—cooperation—will then be examined in order to determine whether the police 
believe legitimacy is associated with this desirable citizen behavior. Furthermore, the 
current study will examine whether the effects of procedural justice, distributive justice, 
and performance are invariant across different groups of responding officers (i.e., 
different individual respondent or agency characteristics). Finally, other potential 
moderating variables which might alter the relationships between procedural justice, 
performance, distributive justice, trust in the police, and obligation to obey the police will 
be considered. These include level of crime (i.e., high or low), perceived collective 






Data and Sample 
 The present study uses survey data from a nationally representative sample of law 
enforcement executives drawn from the 2014 National Directory of Law Enforcement 
Administrators (NDLEA) database. This database lists information for 16,492 law 
enforcement agencies in the U.S. Included in the database are the name and address of 
the chief executive for each agency, the population served by the agency, the agency type 
(e.g., county or municipal police, sheriff’s department, state police/highway patrol), the 
number of officers, and the region of the U.S. in which the agency is located. All 
municipal and county police departments as well as sheriff’s departments in the U.S. 
were included in the sampling frame. State police and highway patrol agencies (n=1,015) 
were excluded because they cover large jurisdictions and tend not to have routine patrol 
duties like municipal police or sheriff’s departments. In addition, a total of 79 sheriff’s 
departments were excluded from the sampling frame because the sheriff’s primary role 
was that of a county coroner. Finally, 24 duplicates were identified and removed, leaving 
a total of 15,374 agencies in the sampling frame. 
Stratification 
In an effort to reduce sampling error and allow for identification of potential 
differences between groups, stratification was used to group similar law enforcement 




(Sudman, 1976).  In terms of population served, agencies were placed into one of four 
groups: 
 Less than 10,000 
 10,000 to 49,999 
 50,000 to 99,999 
 100,000 or more 
The NDLEA database did not provide a population count for 698 agencies. As such, 
these agencies were placed into a fifth “Missing population” stratum for sampling 
purposes. This approach is similar to that of Smith et al. (2008) which used an older 
version of the NDLEA database. More important, to simply exclude those agencies with 
missing population data would be problematic if they are in some way significantly 
different than those agencies that do have population data. Excluding these agencies 
would thus require making an assumption that their population data is missing at random.  
In terms of region, agencies were placed into one of four U.S. census categories—
Northeast, Midwest, South, or West. These are the same regions used by the Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR) program to compile national crime data (see Appendix A for a 
complete listing of all 50 states and Washington, D. C.). It is also possible that law 
enforcement executives in different regions of the U.S. might have different perspectives 
about the foundations of their legitimacy in the eyes of their communities. Finally, with 
regard to agency type, agencies were categorized as either police departments (whether 
county or municipal) or sheriff’s departments. It is conceivable that a sheriff—who is 
elected by the public—might have a different perception of how the community views 
his/her department than a police chief at a municipal agency. As such, it was deemed 
necessary to ensure an adequate number of sheriffs received the survey in order to make 




Sample Size and Selection 
After removing certain agencies as outlined above, 12,315 county or 
city/municipal police agencies and 3,059 sheriff’s departments remained in the sampling 
frame. Appendix B presents the strata used for sample selection along with the number of 
executives available to be surveyed in each group. In an effort to maximize the chances 
of receiving completed surveys from executives at agencies serving large populations, 
those in the 100,000 or more population group were sampled with certainty (n=859). 
These agencies represent only five percent of municipal police/sheriff’s departments in 
the U.S. but their officers/deputies interact with a much larger proportion of the public. 
Thus it was deemed imperative to maximize the probability of receiving completed 
surveys from executives at these agencies. 
All executives in the six strata with fewer than forty law enforcement agencies 
were sampled (46 agencies altogether). The remainder of the sample (n=1,095) was 
drawn from agencies in the other 26 strata. This required 42.12 law enforcement 
executives per stratum. As such, 42 executives were randomly selected from each stratum 
with fewer than 1,000 agencies, and 43 executives were randomly selected from each 
stratum with more than 1,000 agencies. These steps resulted in the selection of 2,000 law 
enforcement executives to receive the survey. 
Data Collection 
Before finalizing the survey, two nearby deputy chiefs pilot tested it and provided 
feedback on the wording of questions, available answer choices, and other components of 
the survey. Their input was considered and necessary changes were made. A modified 




packets were mailed on August 1, 2014, which included a cover letter from the 
researcher, a letter of support from a well-recognized chief of police (Art Acevedo, 
Austin, Texas Police Department), the survey instrument, and a self-addressed, stamped 
return envelope. A follow-up letter was mailed to all 2,000 executives two weeks later. 
Finally, additional surveys were mailed to all remaining non-respondents on September 
1, 2014. In addition to the mail survey, executives were given the option to complete the 
survey online at a password protected website. Research suggests that mixed data 
collection methods such as this can improve response rates (Dillman et al., 2009; Shettle 
& Mooney, 1999). 
After mailing the surveys, a few issues were discovered that resulted in the 
removal of 18 agencies from the sampling frame. Nine additional duplicates were 
identified (i.e., the executive at the agency received two surveys), one agency identified 
itself as a Tribal Police Department on a Native American Reservation, another as a 
military police department, and another as a park police department. These agencies were 
removed from the sampling frame because they serve communities much different from 
the other agencies in its stratum and the sampling frame more generally. In addition, six 
executives called and stated that their agencies do not perform patrol duties. As such, 
these agencies were removed, and collectively, the sampling frame was reduced from 
2,000 to 1,982. Thus 1,982 serves as the denominator in the calculation of response rate.  
Note that the removal of these 18 agencies also reduced the sampling frame from 15,374 
to 15,356. This reduction in the sampling frame is an important consideration for the 




A total of 663 executives returned completed surveys representing a 33.5% 
response rate (72.4% of respondents completed the mail version). However, a total of 20 
surveys were completed by a civilian employee and are thus unfit for inclusion in the 
analyses. As such, all analyses conducted below include responses from sworn personnel 
only (N = 643). As is common in survey research, a small proportion of respondents did 
not provide answers to all of the questions (roughly two percent of cells were missing in 
the dataset). Imputation of missing data was completed using the Stata 13 hotdeck suite 
(Andridge & Little, 2010; Fuller & Kim, 2005; Gmel, 2001; McKnight, McKnight, 
Sidani, & Figueredo, 2007).  
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Roughly 48 percent of 
respondents were indeed the chief executive officer of their agency. The sample was 94.2 
percent male, and over four-fifths of the respondents were White (87.7 percent). 
Experience in law enforcement ranged from 4.5 to 50 years with a mean and median of 
about 27 years. Three-fourths of the respondents had been employed at their current 
agency for at least 10 years, while about 14 percent of the respondents had been in their 
current position for at least 10 years at the time of the survey. Just over half of the 
respondents (55.2 percent) were employed by a municipal or county police department. 
In terms of region, 15 percent of respondents worked in the Northeast, 24 percent in the 
Midwest, 35 percent in the South, and 26 percent in the West. Finally, agencies employed 
on average 372 full-time sworn officers/deputies (median = 100) and provided services to 





Table 3.1. Sample descriptive statistics. 
 
 M S.D. Min Max 
Chief executive .477 -- 0 1 
Male .942 -- 0 1 
Racial minority .123 -- 0 1 
Years in law enforcement 26.9 8.2 4.5 50 
10 years at agency .765 -- 0 1 
10 years in position .137 -- 0 1 
Police department .552 -- 0 1 
Northeast .148 -- 0 1 
Midwest .243 -- 0 1 
South .350 -- 0 1 
West .260 -- 0 1 
Number sworna 372 1571.9 0 34,979 
Population servedb 218,860 497,825.3 118 8,175,136 




High versus Low Crime Areas 
 In order to account for potential variation in the understanding of their legitimacy 
in the eyes of citizens from different areas of the community, the present study asked 
respondents to consider two areas in their jurisdiction—one characterized by high rates of 
crime and another with relatively low criminal activity. Then, each survey question was 
presented twice—once as it pertained to the high crime area and again as it pertained to 
the low crime area. Respondents were instructed to answer each question as they felt the 
average citizen residing in each of these areas would answer. For the sake of simplicity, 
each of the variables of interest discussed below is presented only once in general terms. 




for low crime areas. This allows for a comparison of how officers feel they are evaluated 
in terms of their legitimacy in each area.  
Dependent Variables 
 Trust. Similar to Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz (2014), the primary outcome of 
interest in the present study is police legitimacy in the eyes of the public as perceived by 
the respondents. Consistent with Tyler’s (1990, 2003) conceptualization of legitimacy, 
respondents were asked questions intended to capture perceived levels of citizens’ trust in 
and obligation to obey the police. However, trust and obligation to obey are treated as 
distinct concepts in order to allow for a more direct comparison to Jonathan-Zamir and 
Harpaz (2014) which used trust as the dependent variable. In order to capture perceived 
levels of citizen trust, respondents were asked the extent to which they felt residents “feel 
the police make the right decisions for people in their area of residence,” “agree with the 
values that guide the work of our agency,” and “believe the police can be trusted to make 
decisions that are right for the people in their neighborhood” (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 
2014; Jonathan-Zamir & Weisburd, 2013). Responses were measured on a four-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). Principal-axis factor analysis 
(PAF) revealed that the six items loaded onto two factors (high crime λ = 2.80, factor 
loadings > 0.57; low crime λ = 1.39, factor loadings > 0.59) and demonstrated strong 
internal consistency (high crime α = .79; low crime α = .77; see, e.g., Cortina, 1993). The 
six items were thus used to construct two scales ranging from 3 to 12, with higher scores 
on the scales suggesting that the responding officer thinks that citizens believe police 
actions are made in good faith and with the community in mind. The distribution of the 




the police, with citizens in low crime areas (M = 9.875, SD = 1.461) thought to have 
slightly higher levels of trust than citizens in high crime areas (M = 8.662, SD = 1.657). 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in the analyses. 
Obligation to obey. In order to capture perceived level of citizens’ obligation to 
obey the police, respondents were asked the extent to which they felt residents “believe 
they should accept decisions made by the police, even if they think the police are wrong,” 
“believe they should do what the police say, even if they do not understand the reason for 
police actions,” “believe they should do what the police say even if they disagree,” and 
“believe they should do what the police say even when they do not like the way they are 
being treated” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Again, responses were measured on a four-
point Likert scale. PAF revealed that the eight items loaded onto two factors (high crime 
λ = 3.75, factor loadings > 0.55; low crime λ = 1.70, factor loadings > 0.64) and 
demonstrated strong internal consistency (high crime α = 0.86; low crime α = 0.82). The 
eight items were thus used to construct two scales ranging from 4 to 16, with higher 
scores on the scales suggesting that the responding officer believes that citizens feel more 
obligated to obey the police.2 The distribution of the two obligation to obey scales 
suggests that the sample believes citizens feel somewhat obligated to obey the police, 
with citizens in low crime areas (M = 10.495, SD = 2.152) again thought to feel slightly 
more obligated than citizens in high crime areas (M = 8.923, SD = 2.438).
                                                          
2 Because trust and obligation to obey are central concepts in the present study, and because there is 
empirical evidence that officers in this sample distinguish between high and low crime areas with regards 
to these concepts, the remaining dependent and independent variables are treated in a similar manner (i.e., 






Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for variables used in analyses. 
 
    
 High crime areas Low crime areas 
 M S.D. Min Max M S.D. Min Max 
 Trust 8.662 1.657 3 12 9.875 1.461 3 12 
 Obligation to obey 8.923 2.438 4 16 10.459 2.152 4 16 
 Cooperation 5.811 1.392 2 8 6.675 1.302 2 8 
 Procedural justice 14.222 2.998 5 20 16.274 2.184 9 20 
 Distributive justice 5.269 1.512 2 8 6.295 1.059 2 8 
 Police performance 17.425 3.229 6 24 19.255 2.555 9 24 
 Collective efficacy 25.222 4.442 11 36 27.837 3.957 18 36 
 Disorder 11.294 3.862 5 20 11.601 4.157 5 20 
 Perceived risk 14.431 2.796 5 20 14.227 2.835 5 20 




 Cooperation. The process-based model of policing suggests that one of the 
desirable outcomes of police legitimacy is citizen cooperation with police in the form of 
reporting crimes and/or providing information to help with a case (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & 
Huo, 2002). As such, respondents were presented with four questions intended to 
measure perceived willingness of citizens to cooperate: “residents are willing to call the 
police to report a crime” and “residents are willing to provide information to the police to 
help find a suspected criminal or solve a case” (Reisig et al., 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 
2003). The items were used to construct two distinct scales (cooperation in high crime 
areas [r = 0.63] and cooperation in low crime areas [r = 0.64]; see Pearson [1895]) 
ranging from 2 to 8, with higher scores indicating that responding officers believe 
citizens are more willing to cooperate with the police. The distribution of the two 
cooperation scales suggests the sample believes citizens in both high (M = 5.811, SD = 
1.392) and low crime areas (M = 6.675, SD = 1.302) are fairly willing to cooperate with 
the police.  
Independent Variables 
 Procedural justice. Procedural justice in the eyes of the public (as perceived by 
the police) was measured using the two components of the concept: (1) quality of 
treatment and (2) quality of decision making. To capture quality of treatment, 
respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed (1 = strongly 
disagree to 4 = strongly agree) that “residents believe officers treat those they encounter 
with politeness and dignity” and “residents believe officers respect the rights of the 
citizens they come in contact with” (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014; Reisig et al., 2007; 




how much they agreed or disagreed (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree) with the 
following statements: “residents believe officers make decisions based on facts, not 
personal interest,” “residents believe officers take the time to listen to people” and 
“residents believe officers allow people involved to express their views before making a 
decision in a case” (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014; Nix et al., 2014; Reisig et al., 2007; 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). PAF revealed that for both high and low crime areas, the 
quality of treatment and quality of decision making items loaded onto a single factor 
(high crime λ = 3.05, factor loadings > 0.70; low crime λ = 2.62, factor loadings > 0.59). 
The items also demonstrated strong internal consistency (high crime α = 0.89; low crime 
α = 0.85) and were therefore summed into two scales ranging from 5 to 20, with higher 
scores indicating that responding officers believe citizens think the police exercise their 
authority in a procedurally fair manner.  
 Distributive justice. Perceptions that community members believe the police 
enforce the law consistently across societal groups were measured using two items. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent they agreed or disagreed (1 = strongly 
disagree to 4 = strongly agree) that “residents believe the police enforce the law 
consistently when dealing with all people” and “residents believe the police provide the 
same quality of service to all citizens” (Reisig et al., 2007). The items were used to 
construct two distinct scales (distributive justice in high crime areas [r = 0.79] and 
distributive justice in low crime areas [r = 0.72]) ranging from 2 to 8, with higher scores 
indicating that responding officers believe citizens think the police distribute their 




 Performance. Citizens’ impressions of police performance (as perceived by the 
respondents) were measured via six survey items on a four-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree): “Residents believe the police are efficient in 
handling crime in their area of residence,” “Residents believe officers respond quickly 
when they call for help,” “Residents believe the police are effective in handling violent 
crimes in the community,” “Residents believe the police are effective in handling drug 
crimes in the community,” “Residents believe the police deal well with property crimes 
in the community,” and “Residents feel this is a safe community during the 
evening/night” (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). PAF revealed 
that for both high and low crime areas, the performance items loaded onto a single factor 
(high crime λ = 3.13, factor loadings > 0.67; low crime λ = 2.87, factor loadings > 0.59). 
The items also demonstrated strong internal consistency (high crime α = 0.87; low crime 
α = 0.85) and as such, were used to construct two summated scales ranging from 6 to 24, 
with higher scores reflecting a belief on the part of responding officers that citizens 
believe the police are effective and efficient in dealing with crime. 
 Collective efficacy. Citizens’ perceived collective efficacy (as understood by the 
police) is conceptualized as the social-psychological cognitive orientation respondents 
believe citizens have toward their community (see Nix et al., 2014). Consistent with 
Sampson et al. (1997), measures of (perceived) informal social control and social 
cohesion/trust constitute collective efficacy in the present study. Informal social control 
was measured by asking respondents how likely (1 = very unlikely to 4 = very likely) 
citizens think it is that someone in their community would do something if (a) teenagers 




painting graffiti on a local building, (c) teenagers were showing disrespect to an adult, 
and (d) a fight broke out near their home. Social cohesion/trust was captured by asking 
respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following statements: “Residents 
believe people in this area are willing to help their neighbors,” “Residents believe this is a 
close-knit community,” “Residents believe people in this area can be trusted,” “Residents 
believe people in this area generally get along with each other,” and “Residents believe 
people in this area share the same values.” PAF demonstrated that the items loaded on 
their respective informal social control (high crime λ = 1.25, factor loadings > 0.62; low 
crime λ = 1.69, factor loadings > 0.47) and social/cohesion trust (high crime λ = 3.09, 
factor loadings > 0.61; low crime λ = 2.88, factor loadings > 0.56) factors. However, 
consistent with Sampson et al. (1997), the four subscales were combined into two 
additive indexes ranging from 9 to 36, which represent citizens’ perceived collective 
efficacy in high and low crime areas as understood by police (high crime α = 0.82; low 
crime α = 0.79).  
 Disorder. Five items were used to measure disorder in the eyes of the public (as 
perceived by the police). Respondents were asked to indicate the extent that they agreed 
or disagreed (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree) that the following five issues 
are perceived as problems by the community: (1) garbage along the streets, (2) graffiti in 
public spaces, (3) gangs hanging out on the streets, (4) people buying/selling drugs on the 
street, and (5) people drinking alcohol on the street (Gau & Pratt, 2008; Nix et al., 2014). 
PAF showed that for both high and low crime areas, the disorder items loaded onto a 
single factor (high crime λ = 2.83, factor loadings > 0.70; low crime λ = 3.26, factor 




crime α = 0.87; low crime α = 0.91) and were thus summed into two perceived disorder 
scales ranging from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicating a belief on the part of 
responding officers that the community perceives greater disorder. 
 Perceived risk of apprehension. It is possible that the police associate their 
legitimacy more so with their ability to create and sustain a credible risk of being caught 
breaking the law (i.e., deterrence). In order to measure perceived risk, respondents were 
asked how likely it is that citizens feel they would be caught and punished for each of the 
following criminal offenses: illegally parking, littering, making too much noise at night, 
breaking traffic laws, and using illegal drugs in public places (Reisig et al., 2007; 
Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). PAF revealed that for both high and low crime areas, the 
perceived risk items loaded onto a single factor (high crime λ = 1.95, factor loadings > 
0.54; low crime λ = 1.75, factor loadings > 0.54). The items also demonstrated strong 
internal consistency (high crime α = 0.77; low crime α = 0.74), and were thus used to 
construct two distinct additive perceived risk scales ranging from 5 to 20, with higher 
scores indicating a greater perceived likelihood of being caught and punished for 
breaking the law.3 The distribution of the two perceived risk scales indicates that the 
sample believes citizens in both high and low crime areas perceive similar probabilities 
of being caught and punished for law-breaking behaviors (high crime M = 14.431, SD = 
2.696; low crime M = 14.227, SD = 2.835).  
                                                          
3 An argument could be made that perceived risk of apprehension is a component of performance. 
However, for both high and low crime areas, PAF revealed that the items loaded onto separate factors. In 
addition, the correlation between the perceived risk and performance scales is low for both high (b = .18) 
and low crime areas (b = .17). Perhaps as the responding officers read the performance questions, they were 
more apt to consider law-abiding citizens, whereas when reading the perceived risk questions, they pictured 





 Legal cynicism. Cynicism toward the law on the part of citizens (as perceived by 
the police) is measured via six items. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement (1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree) with each of the following 
statements: “Residents believe the law does not protect their interests,” “Residents 
believe laws were made to be broken,” “Residents believe it is okay to break laws as long 
as they believe they aren’t hurting anyone,” “Residents believe that there are no right and 
wrong ways to make money,” “Residents believe that fighting between friends or within 
families is nobody else’s business,” and “Residents believe that nowadays a person has to 
live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself” (Sampson & Jeglum-
Bartusch, 1998; Tyler & Huo, 2002). PAF revealed that for both high and low crime 
areas, the legal cynicism items loaded onto a single factor (high crime λ = 2.93, factor 
loadings > 0.52; low crime λ = 2.26, factor loadings > 0.43). Because the items also 
demonstrated strong internal consistency (high crime α = 0.85; low crime α = 0.78), they 
were summed to create two legal cynicism indexes ranging from 5 to 20, with higher 
scores indicating the responding officers believe citizens are more cynical of the law. 
Control Variables 
 In addition to the abovementioned variables, several demographic control 
variables are included in the analyses in order to provide unbiased estimates of key 
predictor variables on respondents’ perceptions of trust, obligation to obey, and the 
likelihood of cooperation from the public. Rank (1 = chief executive), as well as 
experience both at the current agency and in the current position are all dummy coded (1 
= 10 or more years of experience). Gender (1 = male), race (1 = racial minority) and 




also dummy coded. Region is measured with three dummy variables (Midwest, South, 
and West—Northeast is the reference category; see Appendix B for a complete listing of 
states that fall into each region). Large city is defined as those agencies in the 75th 
percentile of the sample in terms of population served (1 = agencies serving 210,000 or 
more citizens). 
Analytic Strategy 
 Four primary research questions will be addressed in the present study. They are 
as follows: 
1. What do the police see as the foundation of their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
public? 
2. Do the police believe that citizen feelings of trust and obligation to obey are 
associated with cooperation? 
3. Are the effects of key predictor variables (i.e., procedural justice, distributive 
justice, and performance) on trust and obligation to obey as perceived by the 
police invariant across different types of responding officers (i.e., across 
various individual and agency characteristics)? 
4. Do contextual variables moderate the relationship between key predictor 
variables and trust and obligation to obey as perceived by the police? 
Police Perceptions of the Foundation of their Legitimacy in the Eyes of the Public 
 In order to first replicate Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz’s (2014) findings, a series of 
four regression models are used to determine what respondents see as the foundation of 
citizen levels of trust in the police. Each of these four regression models are performed 
twice—once for high crime areas and again for low crime areas. Model 1 examines the 
degree to which respondents believe procedural justice is associated with citizens’ levels 
of trust in the police, net of statistical controls. Models 2 and 3 estimate the effects of 
distributive justice and police performance, respectively, on perceived levels of citizen 




justice, distributive justice, and performance as predictors of perceived levels of trust in 
order to determine which variable exerts the strongest effect, holding all else constant. 
Analyzing the data in this fashion will make it possible to determine which variable is 
more important in terms of its effect on perceived trust and if any of the effects are 
partially confounded by other variables. 
 In addition to perceived levels of citizen trust, perceived obligation to obey the 
police is also examined using a series of four regression models. The first model 
examines the effect of procedural justice on perceived obligation to obey net of statistical 
controls. Models 2 and 3 examine the effect of distributive justice and police performance 
on perceived obligation to obey net of statistical controls. The fourth and final model 
simultaneously examines the effect of procedural justice, distributive justice, and police 
performance on perceived obligation to obey, net of statistical controls, in order to 
determine which theoretical construct has the strongest impact on perceived obligation to 
obey according to the respondent officers. 
Police Perceptions of the Effects of Trust and Obligation to Obey 
 The next step of the analysis is to determine whether respondents’ perceived 
levels of trust and obligation to obey are associated with higher levels of perceived 
cooperation from the public. A series of six regression models will be used to address this 
question. In the first model, the effect of procedural justice on cooperation will be 
examined, net of statistical controls. The second and third models examine the effects of 
distributive justice and performance, respectively, on cooperation net of statistical 
controls. The fourth model examines the extent to which respondents believe trust is 




the relationship between obligation to obey and cooperation, net of statistical controls. 
The sixth and final model simultaneously examines the effect of procedural justice, 
distributive justice, performance, trust, and obligation to obey on cooperation, net of 
statistical controls.  
Invariance across Individual and Agency Characteristics 
 As Tyler (1990. p. 121) suggests, research is needed which tests the universality 
or invariance of procedural justice theory. In terms of the dialogic approach to 
legitimacy, this means the extent to which individual- (e.g., rank, gender, race, and 
experience) and agency-level variables (e.g., population served and agency type) 
moderate the relationship between procedural justice and perceived trust and obligation 
to obey in the eyes of the public. First, the effects of the key predictor variables (i.e., 
procedural justice, distributive justice, and performance) on perceived trust and 
obligation to obey in the eyes of the public are tested across respondent rank, gender, 
race and experience. To do so, mean-centered, multiplicative interaction terms are 
created between each key predictor variable and rank, gender, race, and experience, 
respectively. Statistically significant interaction effects would suggest that the influence 
of key predictor variables on trust and obligation to obey are moderated by these 
individual-level variables. The margins command available in Stata 13 is used to further 
explore any statistically significant interaction effects. Next, the effects of the key 
predictor variables on perceived trust and obligation to obey in the eyes of the public are 
tested across agency type and population. Again, interaction terms are created which, if 
significant, suggest that the influence of key predictor variables on legitimacy are 





Invariance across Potentially Moderating Variables 
 In addition to testing for invariance across individual- and agency-level 
characteristics, the possibility that the four previously mentioned contextual variables 
condition the influence of key predictor variables on perceived legitimacy in the eyes of 
the public will also be considered. That is, do respondents feel that citizen perceptions of 
collective efficacy, disorder, risk, and cynicism toward the law moderate the procedural 
justice-trust and/or procedural justice-obligation to obey relationships? To test for the 
invariance of procedural justice across these potentially moderating variables, interaction 
terms are created between each key predictor variable and each confounding variable, 
respectively. Thus a total of 12 interaction terms will be created—four each for the 
procedural justice, distributive justice, and performance scales. Again, the margins 
command available in Stata 13 is used to further explore any statistically significant 
interaction effects. 
Weighting Procedure 
 Because agencies within various strata had different probabilities of being 
selected, and because the strata produced variable response rates, a weighting procedure 
is used to provide a better understanding of police perceptions of their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public nationwide. Each strata is weighted based on the extent to which the 
population of agencies in each stratum is represented by the survey respondents that 
belong to that strata. That is, the strata are weighted so that the findings from this sample 
are more representative of agencies nationwide (foregoing this weighting procedure 
would ultimately result in biased estimates). Appendix C provides the number of 




agencies among all municipal/county police and sheriff’s departments in the sampling 
frame (N = 15,356), the number of agencies among the survey respondents, and the 
percentage representation of these agencies among survey respondents used in the 
analyses (N = 643). The weights used in each of the analyses are obtained by dividing 
Column B by Column D (see Smith et al., 2010 for a similar discussion). 
Collinearity 
Diagnostic tests demonstrated that harmful levels of collinearity do not appear to 
be present in the multivariate models presented below. All bivariate correlations fell 
below an absolute value of 0.77 for the high crime area variables and .69 for the low 
crime area variables (see Appendix D). Typically 0.80 is used as a threshold indicative of 
harmful collinearity (Mason & Perreault, 1991). Furthermore, all variance inflation 







Police Perceptions of the Foundations of Their Legitimacy in the Eyes of the Public
Table 4.1 uses Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) to explore the perceived 
independent and additive effects of procedural justice, distributive justice, and 
performance on trust in the police among citizens in high crime areas. In Model 1, the 
trust in high crime areas scale is regressed onto the five-item procedural justice in high 
crime areas scale along with fourteen control variables. The joint association test reveals 
that the model provides more explanatory power than would be expected by chance alone 
(F = 19.85, p < .01) and the coefficient of multiple determination is large (R2 = .59). The 
unstandardized partial regression coefficient (b) suggests that the procedural justice 
estimate is associated with trust in the expected direction (b = .362, p < .01). This implies 
that respondents in the sample who think citizens residing in high crime areas perceive 
greater procedural justice on the part of police believe citizens are more trusting of the 
police than their counterparts. Finally, two control variables exert significant effects: 
disorder and legal cynicism. Respondents who feel citizens in high crime areas perceive a 
greater amount of disorder tend to believe they are more trusting of the police (b = .051, p 
< .05). This finding conflicts with prior research using citizen surveys which suggests 
that those who perceive greater levels of disorder tend to afford less trust to the police 
(Jackson et al., 2012a; Nix et al., 2014). Conversely, respondents who believe citizens in 




police (b = -.121, p < .01). This finding is in line with prior citizen research which 
suggests citizens who are more cynical towards the law and legal authorities view these 
entities as less trustworthy (Carr et al., 2007; Sampson & Jeglum-Bartusch, 1998). 
In Model 2, the trust scale is regressed onto a two-item distributive justice in high 
crime areas scale along with each of the control variables. This results in a slight 
reduction in the explanatory power of the model when compared to Model 1 (R2 is 
reduced by 5 percent). The unstandardized partial regression coefficient indicates that the 
distributive justice estimate (b = .579, p < .01) is significantly and positively related to 
perceived trust in the police. This suggests that respondents who believe citizens in high 
crime areas perceive greater distributive justice on the part of the police are more likely 
to believe citizens bestow trust in the police (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). In Model 3, the 
trust scale is regressed onto a six item police performance scale. Although the model as a 
whole is statistically significant, it has 15 percent less explanatory power than Model 1. 
The statistically significant performance estimate (b = .258, p < .01) implies that 
respondents believe when citizens in high crime areas positively evaluate police 
performance, they are more likely to trust the police. This finding reinforces those of 
Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz (2014), who found that performance was significantly 
associated with perceived trust among their sample of Israeli National Police officers. 
In Model 4, the trust scale is regressed simultaneously onto the procedural justice, 
distributive justice, and performance scales along with each of the fourteen control 
variables. The R2 value improves to .64, an 8 percent increase from Model 1. Three 
findings warrant attention. First, each of the three theoretical variables of interest—






Table 4.1. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust in the police in high crime areas. 
 
 Trust in the police—High crime areasa 














Procedural justice .362** 
(.045) 
.655 -- -- -- -- .227** 
(.059) 
.411 
Distributive justice -- -- .579** 
(.092) 
.527 -- -- .260* 
(.107) 
.237 




































































































Table 4.1 (continued). The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust in the police in high crime areas. 
 
 Trust in the police—High crime areasa 



























































F test 19.85** 14.70** 18.56** 23.27** 
R2 .59 .56 .50 .64 
a Ordinary Least Squares regression; b “Sheriff’s Department” is the reference category; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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performance (b = .085, p < .05)—are statistically significant, which suggests the 
respondents believe each of these concepts are important to establishing trust in the eyes 
of the community. Second, procedural justice dominates the model, as evidenced by the 
size of the standardized partial regression coefficient (β = .411, p < .01) and the reduction 
in magnitude of both distributive justice (down 55 percent from Model 2) and 
performance (down 67 percent from Model 3) coefficients. The Difference in 
Coefficients Test (Clogg, Petkova, & Shihadeh, 1992) reveals that each of these 
reductions are statistically significant at the p < .05 level, which is evidence that the 
effects of distributive justice and performance on trust are partially confounded by 
procedural justice. Finally, disorder and legal cynicism retain statistical significance in 
Model 4, which is an indication that the police believe these concepts to be closely 
connected to levels of citizen trust in high crime areas. Collectively, the findings suggest 
that the respondents in this sample believe that among citizens residing in high crime 
areas, procedural justice is strongly correlated with trust in the police (Tyler & Huo, 
2002). 
In Table 4.2, obligation to obey in high crime areas is regressed onto each of the 
procedural justice, distributive justice, and performance scales along with the control 
variables in the same manner discussed above. While each of the four models provide 
more explanatory power than could be expected by chance alone, the coefficients of 
multiple determination are much lower than those in Table 4.1 (e.g., Model 4, Table 4.2 
R2 = .39; Model 4, Table 4.1 R2 = .64). The procedural justice estimate in Model 4 (β = 
.224, p < .05) is much smaller than the estimate in Model 4 of Table 4.1, which suggests 
respondents believe perceived procedural fairness of the police is more closely associated 
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with citizen trust than with their feeling obligated to obey the police. In addition, the size 
of the performance estimate (β = .236, p < .05) indicates that respondents believe 
performance is equally as important as procedural fairness in terms of fostering an 
obligation to obey the police among citizens in high crime areas. Finally, the data reveal 
that respondents who work for agencies in the West (b= .846, p < .05) are more apt to 
believe citizens in high crime areas feel obligated to obey the police (relative to 
respondents working for agencies in the Northeast). 
 Table 4.3 regresses trust in low crime areas onto the procedural justice, 
distributive justice, and performance in low crime areas scales, along with each of the 
aforementioned control variables. Several points are worthy of discussion. First, although 
the four models are statistically significant, they explain less of the variation in trust in 
low crime areas than the models in Table 4.1 which involve trust in high crime areas. 
This is an indication that respondents feel procedural justice, distributive justice, and 
performance are less important in terms of generating trust among citizens residing in 
low crime areas. At the same time, Model 4 in Table 4.3 reveals that respondents believe 
procedural (β = .276, p < .01) and distributive fairness (β = .267, p < .01)—and to a lesser 
extent, performance (β = .174, p < .01)—are associated with trust among citizens residing 
in low crime areas. 
Secondly, it appears that in low crime areas, procedural justice partially 
confounds the effect of legal cynicism on trust in the police. Legal cynicism has a 
statistically significant, negative relationship with trust in Models 2 and 3, which do not 
include procedural justice. In Models 1 and 4, which do account for procedural justice, 






Table 4.2. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on obligation to obey in high crime areas. 
 
 Obligation to obey—High crime areasa 














Procedural justice .391** 
(.077) 
.481 -- -- -- -- .182* 
(.072) 
.224 
Distributive justice -- -- .694** 
(.159) 
.431 -- -- .333 
(.181) 
.207 




































































































Table 4.2 (continued). The perceived effect of key predictor variables on obligation to obey in high crime areas. 
 
 Obligation to obey—High crime areasa 



























































F test 7.29** 6.67** 6.54** 8.14** 
R2 .33 .34 .33 .39 






Table 4.3. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust in the police in low crime areas. 
 
 Trust in the police—Low crime areasa 














Procedural justice .362** 
(.061) 
.541 -- -- -- -- .185** 
(.051) 
.276 
Distributive justice -- -- .649** 
(.126) 
.470 -- -- .368** 
(.125) 
.267 




































































































Table 4.3 (continued). The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust in the police in low crime areas. 
 
 Trust in the police—Low crime areasa 



























































F test 9.36** 9.24** 11.16** 12.16** 
R2 .46 .47 .42 .52 
a Ordinary Least Squares regression; b “Sheriff’s Department” is the reference category; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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statistically significant predictor of trust (b = -.076, p < .05) in Table 4.3. In other words, 
respondents perceive that in low crime areas, citizens who believe the police create and 
sustain a credible risk for law-breaking behavior are less likely to trust the police. 
 In Table 4.4, obligation to obey in low crime areas is regressed onto each of the 
aforementioned independent and control variables. Several findings merit discussion. 
First, joint association tests reveal that each model explains more of the variation in 
obligation to obey than could be expected by chance alone, yet the coefficients of 
multiple determination are smaller than those presented in Table 4.2 (i.e., R2 ranges from 
.17 to .23). This is an indication that the sample believes this set of variables is less 
associated with obligation to obey among citizens in low crime areas than in high crime 
areas. Second, performance (b = .216, p < .01) retains statistical significance in Model 4 
while procedural justice and distributive justice do not. That is, respondents believe that 
in low crime areas, citizens are more likely to feel obligated to obey the police when they 
feel the police are performing well than when they feel the police are procedurally fair or 
fairly distribute outcomes. Third, performance appears to partially account for the 
relationship between both (1) procedural justice and obligation to obey and (2) 
distributive justice and obligation to obey. The procedural justice coefficient is reduced 
by 113 percent from Model 1 to Model 4, while the distributive justice coefficient is 
reduced by 32 percent from Model 2 to Model 4 (the differences are not statistically 
significant). These findings indicate that respondents believe that in the eyes of the 
public, performance is the key to generating feelings of obligation to obey the police. 
Finally, respondents working in the West (b = .974, p < .05) tend to believe citizens feel 






Table 4.4. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on obligation to obey in low crime areas. 
 
 Obligation to obey—Low crime areasa 














Procedural justice .228* 
(.109) 
.231 -- -- -- -- -.030 
(.159) 
-.031 
Distributive justice -- -- .591** 
(.191) 
.291 -- -- .402 
(.278) 
.198 




































































































Table 4.4 (continued). The perceived effect of key predictor variables on obligation to obey in low crime areas. 
 
 Obligation to obey—Low crime areasa 



























































F test 3.05** 3.02** 3.44** 3.22** 
R2 .17 .20 .21 .23 
a Ordinary Least Squares regression; b “Sheriff’s Department” is the reference category; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Police Perceptions of the Effects of Trust and Obligation to Obey 
 The analyses in Table 4.5 explore the perceived independent and additive effects 
of procedural justice, distributive justice, performance, trust, and obligation to obey on 
the perceived likelihood of citizens in high crime areas cooperating with the police. The 
process-based model of regulation suggests that the effect of procedural justice on 
cooperation operates through trust and obligation to obey (Tyler & Huo, 2002). The 
analyses in Table 4.5 explore whether the police believe this to be the case in high crime 
areas of their communities. Model 1 regresses the two-item cooperation scale onto the 
procedural justice scale along with each of the control variables. The model as a whole is 
statistically significant and accounts for roughly 47 percent of the variation in perceived 
likelihood of cooperation (i.e., reporting crimes and providing information to the police 
to help find a suspected criminal or solve a case) in high crime areas (F = 18.28, p < .01). 
Procedural justice has a positive and significant relationship with perceived cooperation 
(b = .164, p < .01), which suggests the police believe citizens in high crime areas are 
more likely to cooperate with the police when they also evaluate police actions as being 
procedurally fair. However, several other variables in the model are statistically 
significant. Those respondents with ten or more years of experience in their current 
position are more inclined to believe citizens in high crime areas are willing to cooperate 
with the police, relative to their counterparts with less than ten years in their current 
position (b = .548, p < .05). Collective efficacy is also significant (b = .058, p < .05), 
which suggests respondents believe that citizens in high crime areas are more willing to 
cooperate with the police when there is a greater degree of collective efficacy (i.e., 
informal social control and social cohesion) present among residents. Respondents from 
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county and municipal police departments believe citizens in high crime areas are less 
likely to cooperate, relative to respondents from sheriff’s departments (b = -.390, p < 
.05). Finally, respondents tend to believe greater cynicism toward the law among citizens 
in high crime areas is associated with less cooperation (b = -.099, p < .01). 
 Model 2 regresses cooperation onto the distributive justice index along with each 
of the control variables. The model is statistically significant and explains an amount of 
variation equal to that of Model 1 in the perceived likelihood of citizen cooperation (F = 
16.70, p < .01; R2 = .47). The effect of distributive justice is moderately strong (b = .278, 
p < .01), which suggests the respondents believe cooperation from the public is more 
likely to occur when citizens believe the police enforce the law consistently and provide 
the same quality of service to all citizens. The effect of having held the current position 
for ten or more years is no longer significant, while the effects of collective efficacy, 
legal cynicism, and employment at a county or municipal police department remain 
largely unchanged from Model 1 to Model 2. Finally, perceived risk is negatively 
associated with cooperation (b = -.059, p < .05), which indicates that respondents believe 
that when citizens feel there is a greater risk of being caught and punished for law-
breaking behavior, they are less likely to cooperate.  
 In Model 3, cooperation is regressed onto the performance index along with each 
of the control variables. This model is statistically significant and accounts for slightly 
more variation in perceived cooperation (F = 15.71, p < .01; R2 = .50) than Models 1 or 2. 
The performance estimate is significantly and positively related to cooperation (b = .187, 
p < .01), which indicates that respondents believe police performance (e.g., responding 






Table 4.5. The perceived effect of key predictor variables, trust, and obligation to obey on cooperation in high crime areas. 
 
 Cooperation—High crime areasa 





























-- -- .278** 
(.071) 
.302 -- -- -- -- -- -- .060 
(.064) 
.065 
Performance -- -- -- -- .187** 
(.037) 
.434 -- -- -- -- .129** 
(.045) 
.300 
Trust -- -- -- -- -- -- .252** 
(.077) 

























































































































































Table 4.5 (continued). The perceived effect of key predictor variables, trust, and obligation to obey on cooperation in high crime 
areas. 
 
 Cooperation—High crime areasa 



























































































F test 18.28** 16.70** 15.71** 16.15** 13.18** 16.07** 
R2 .47 .47 .50 .46 .43 .52 










important to citizens in terms of their willingness to cooperate with police. Again, ten or 
more years in the current position, employment at a county or municipal police 
department, collective efficacy, and legal cynicism are each statistically significant and 
the relationships are all in the same direction as in Model 1.  
 Model 4 regresses cooperation onto the trust scale and each of the control 
variables. The model is statistically significant and accounts for about 46 percent of the 
variation in perceived cooperation (F = 16.15, p < .01). The trust estimate is moderately 
strong (b = .252, p < .01), which is evidence that respondents who believe citizens trust 
the police are more likely to cooperate. This finding parallels prior research with citizen 
samples which suggests that trust promotes cooperation with police (Sargeant et al., 
2013).  Years in current position, employment at a county or municipal police 
department, collective efficacy, perceived risk, and legal cynicism are also statistically 
significant in Model 4. In Model 5, cooperation is regressed onto the obligation to obey 
index along with each of the controls. The model accounts for slightly less variation than 
Model 4 (R2 = .43) but is still statistically significant (F = 13.18, p < .01). Similarly, the 
obligation to obey estimate (β = .200, p < .05) is weaker than the trust estimate in Model 
4 (β = .300, p < .01), but statistically significant nonetheless. This suggests respondents 
believe citizens in high crime areas are more likely to cooperate with police when they 
also feel obligated to obey the police. Jackson et al. (2012a) report similar findings using 
METPAS data. The perceived risk estimate does not retain statistical significance from 




 Model 6 regresses cooperation onto each of the procedural justice, distributive 
justice, performance, trust, and obligation to obey scales along with all of the control 
variables. Two findings are worthy of discussion. First, performance dominates the 
model, as evidenced by the fact that it is the only key theoretical variable that is 
statistically significant (b = .129, p < .01). The procedural justice, distributive justice, 
trust, and obligation to obey coefficients are each reduced in magnitude by roughly 68, 
78, 78, and 91 percent, respectively (the reduction in the magnitude of the distributive 
justice coefficient is statistically significant at p < .05). Moreover, the model as a whole 
only accounts for slightly more of the variation in cooperation (R2 = .52) than any of the 
previous models. That is, accounting for procedural justice, distributive justice, trust, and 
obligation to obey in addition to performance only yields a 2 percent increase in the 
amount of explained variation in perceived cooperation (Model 3 R2 = .50). This finding 
is in stark contrast to Tyler’s research, which suggests that procedural justice—more so 
than performance—should increase cooperation through its effect on variables such as 
trust and obligation to obey (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002; c.f. Tankebe, 2009). 
Second, a number of control variables remain statistically significant even after 
accounting for each of the theoretical variables of interest. Table 4.5 reveals that: (1) 
respondents believe that in high crime areas, performance is the key to generating 
cooperation from the public, and (2) respondents also believe that collective efficacy, 
perceived risk, and legal cynicism each exert an important effect on the likelihood of 
cooperation with police. 
 Table 4.6 explores the perceived independent and additive effects of each of the 
aforementioned variables on the perceived likelihood of citizens in low crime areas 
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cooperating with the police. Model 1 regresses the cooperation in low crime areas scale 
onto the procedural justice scale along with each control variable. The model as a whole 
is statistically significant (F = 7.39, p < .01) and accounts for roughly 37 percent of the 
variation in perceived likelihood of public cooperation. The procedural justice estimate (b 
= .290, p < .01) indicates that respondents from the sample believe citizens residing in 
low crime areas who perceive police actions as procedurally fair are more likely to 
cooperate with the police. Furthermore, the standardized partial regression coefficient for 
procedural justice (β = .487) is larger in Model 1 of Table 4.6 than in Model 1 of Table 
4.5 (β = .354). This suggests that respondents believe procedural justice is more closely 
associated with citizen cooperation in low crime areas than in high crime areas. Finally, 
the only other variable that emerges as statistically significant is collective efficacy (b = 
.060, p < .01), which is an indication that respondents believe those citizens who perceive 
greater collective efficacy among residents are more likely to cooperate. 
 Similar findings emerge in Models 2 through 5. In Model 2, both distributive 
justice (β = .415, p < .01) and collective efficacy (β = .234, p < .01) are positively 
associated with perceived likelihood of cooperation from the public. In Model 3, 
performance (β = .513, p < .01) and collective efficacy (β = .173, p < .05) are positively 
associated with cooperation. And in Model 4, trust (β = .470, p < .01) and collective 
efficacy (β = .235, p < .01) emerge as the only statistically significant variables. In 
addition, each of the coefficients for the independent variables in these models are larger 
than their respective coefficients from the models in Table 4.5—again indicating that 
respondents feel these concepts are more closely associated with citizen cooperation in 






Table 4.6. The perceived effect of key predictor variables, trust, and obligation to obey on cooperation in low crime areas. 
 
 Cooperation—Low crime areasa 





























-- -- .510** 
(.139) 
.415 -- -- -- -- -- -- .130 
(.113) 
.106 
Performance -- -- -- -- .262** 
(.053) 
.513 -- -- -- -- .127** 
(.048) 
.248 
Trust -- -- -- -- -- -- .419** 
(.107) 

























































































































































Table 4.6 (continued). The perceived effect of key predictor variables, trust, and obligation to obey on cooperation in low 
crime areas. 
 
 Cooperation—Low crime areasa 



























































































F test 7.39** 4.70** 7.38** 7.48** 4.17** 6.51** 
R2 .37 .38 .40 .40 .30 .49 
a Ordinary Least Squares regression; b “Sheriff’s Department” is the reference category; *p < .05; **p < .01 
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p < .05) is positively correlated with cooperation, along with collective efficacy (β = 
.284, p < .05). In addition, legal cynicism (β = -.249, p < .01) is negatively associated 
with perceived cooperation. Finally, Model 5 explains somewhat less of the variation in 
perceived cooperation (about 30 percent) than Models 1 through 4 (between 37 and 40 
percent). 
 Model 6 simultaneously regresses cooperation onto all of the independent and 
control variables. The model is statistically significant (F = 6.51, p < .01) and explains 
nearly half of the variation in perceived cooperation. Four key findings emerge from 
Model 6 and Table 4.6, more generally. First, and consistent with the findings from Table 
4.5, performance (b = .127, p < .01) dominates the model. The magnitude of the 
procedural and distributive justice coefficients are reduced by 71 and 75 percent, 
respectively (each reduction is statistically significant at p < .05). The trust and obligation 
to obey coefficients are also reduced by 49 and 65 percent, respectively, though the 
reductions are not statistically significant. This suggests that respondents from the sample 
believe citizens are most likely to cooperate with the police when they believe the police 
are performing well (see Tankebe, 2009). Second, collective efficacy is also statistically 
significant (b = .045, p < .05), which again indicates that respondents believe perceived 
collective efficacy among citizens in low crime areas is connected to their likelihood of 
cooperating with the police. Third, the larger standardized partial regression coefficients 
in Models 1 through 4 of Table 4.6 suggest that respondents feel these concepts are more 
closely tied to cooperation among citizens residing in low crime areas than their 
counterparts living in high crime areas. However, there is not as much of a disparity 
between the standardized partial regression coefficients for performance in Models 6 of 
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Tables 4.5 and 4.6. This implies that, all else considered, respondents believe 
performance to be equally correlated with cooperation among citizens in both high and 
low crime areas. If anything, respondents believe performance is slightly more associated 
with cooperation in high crime areas. Finally, neither years in the current position nor 
employment at a county or municipal police department emerge as statistically significant 
in any of the models in Table 4.6. This implies that—at least among the individual 
characteristics measured—there is less variation among respondents in terms of their 
perceptions regarding the likelihood of citizen cooperation in low crime areas than high 
crime areas. That is, respondents with more years in their current position tend to believe 
citizens in high crime areas are more willing to cooperate, while respondents employed at 
county or municipal agencies tend to believe cooperation is less likely in high crime areas 
(relative to those working at a sheriff’s office). These individual characteristics do not 
appear to influence the perceived likelihood of cooperation among citizens living in low 
crime areas. This finding will be further explored in subsequent analyses. 
Invariance across Individual and Agency Characteristics 
Individual Characteristics 
 Table 4.7 tests whether respondent characteristics moderate the relationship 
between the key predictor variables and perceived trust from residents in high crime 
areas. A separate OLS regression equation was estimated for each of five respondent 
characteristics: executive, male, racial minority, 10 years at agency, and 10 years in 
position. For each equation, a mean-centered, multiplicative interaction term between 
each of the key predictor variables and the respondent characteristic under consideration 
was created. For example, the first column, (“Executive”) and the first row (“Procedural 
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justice x [Var]”) presents the unstandardized regression coefficient and standard error for 
the interaction effect between executive and procedural justice on trust in high crime 
areas. Hence, each model estimates the effects of three interaction effects while 
controlling for agency characteristics and perceived context (i.e., collective efficacy, 
disorder, perceived risk, and legal cynicism). 
 Three key findings emerge from Table 4.7. First, the executive*distributive justice 
interaction is statistically significant (b = .547, p < .01). This indicates that in this sample, 
executives in particular are more likely to believe that citizens in high crime areas trust 
the police when they believe the police distribute their services and enforce the law 
equally throughout the community. Using the margins command in Stata, the effect of 
distributive fairness on trust in high crime areas was estimated along each value of the 
moderator variable (i.e., executive). Figure 4.1 graphically depicts the results of the 
marginal analysis for the interaction effect by plotting the slope of distributive justice on 
trust in high crime areas for executives and non-executives. The graph indicates that the 
effect of distributive justice on trust in the police in high crime areas is stronger for 
executives than non-executives. In other words, executives tend to believe distributive 
fairness is more closely associated with trust in the eyes of the public than officers 
holding other ranks. 
 Second, two other interaction effects are statistically significant: 10 years in 
position*distributive justice (b = .733, p < .01) and 10 years in position*performance (b 
= -.282, p < .01). Again using the margins command in Stata, Figures 4.2 and 4.3 provide 
graphical depictions of each of these interaction effects, respectively. Figure 4.2 plots the 






Table 4.7. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust in high crime areas across respondent characteristics. 
 
 Trust in the police—High crime areasa 
Variable [Executive] [Male] [Racial minority] [10 years at agency] [10 years in position] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] -.057 .101 -.070 .111 .071 .096 -.197 .104 -.086 .080 
Distributive justice x [Var] .547** .189 -.009 .400 -.173 .168 .065 .201 .733** .195 
Performance x [Var] -.122 .076 -.061 .139 .029 .072 .050 .091 -.282** .049 
Procedural justice .271** .085 .295** .091 .213** .068 .354** .076 .260** .050 
Distributive justice -.195 .158 .271 .369 .295* .132 .227 .160 .140 .099 
Performance .196** .063 .146 .134 .079 .042 .068 .071 .151** .039 
Executive -.225 .156 -.259 .174 -.265 .167 -.251 .171 -.222 .161 
Male .157 .254 .272 .345 .257 .288 .019 .279 .188 .239 
Racial minority .231 .170 .234 .173 .280 .166 .283 .163 .270 .159 
10 years at agency -.046 .188 -.037 .192 -.045 .191 -.044 .193 -.026 .183 
10 years in position -.083 .211 -.085 .211 -.099 .203 -.148 .208 -.107 .179 
Police departmentb .037 .173 .075 .178 .078 .179 .023 .171 -.033 .160 
Midwest -.009 .247 -.058 .247 -.029 .244 .002 .234 -.305 .224 
South -.198 .240 -.277 .240 -.271 .245 .297 .237 -.433 .225 
West .303 .243 .252 .241 .303 .243 .341 .232 .008 .229 
Large city -.009 .158 -.059 .173 -.071 .176 -.081 .171 .021 .174 
Collective efficacy -.017 .028 -.021 .029 -.020 .030 -.031 .028 -.014 .025 
Disorder .059** .020 .062** .020 .060** .020 .065** .020 .059** .019 
Perceived risk .023 .029 .018 .026 .017 .026 .027 .025 .012 .026 
Legal cynicism -.087** .031 -.090** .033 -.091** .033 -.074* .030 -.064* .032 
Intercept 9.135** .985 9.248** 1.017 9.305** 1.027 9.366** .960 9.131** .928 
F test 22.08** 20.56** 20.09** 20.22** 64.85** 
R2 .65 .64 .64 .65 .68 





Figure 4.1. Interaction between distributive justice and executive on perceived trust in 
high crime areas.  
 
their current position and respondents with fewer than 10 years in their current position. 
As shown in the graph, the effect of distributive justice on trust in the police in high 
crime areas is stronger for respondents with 10 or more years than those with fewer than 
10 years. That is, respondents in this sample with 10 or more years in their current 
position believe distributive justice is more closely correlated with trust in the eyes of 
citizens living in high crime areas (relative to their counterparts with fewer than 10 years 
in their current position). Figure 4.3 plots the slope of performance onto trust in high 
crime areas for respondents with 10 or more years in their current position and those with 
fewer than 10 years, respectively. Among those with 10 or more years, the slope of 
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performance is negative, indicating that this subgroup of respondents believes 
performance to be inversely linked to trust. Put differently, those with 10 or more years 
of experience in their current position tend to believe better performance yields less trust 
in the eyes of citizens residing in high crime areas. Perhaps this is due to a belief among 
these officers that individuals living in high crime areas are guilty of committing the very 
crimes they believe the police are controlling (e.g., property, drug, and/or violent crimes; 
see Klinger, 1997). If so, this would perhaps imply that officers with 10 or more years in 
their current position are more cynical and believe that citizens in high crime areas are 
less trusting of the police when they are performing well because they believe the police 
are harassing them. Finally, Table 4.7 reveals the perceived effect of procedural justice 
on trust in the eyes of citizens residing in high crime areas is invariant across rank, 
gender, race, and experience (both at the current agency and in the current position) in 
this sample. Similarly, the perceived effects of distributive justice and performance on 
trust in the eyes of citizens living in high crime areas appears to be invariant across 
gender, race, and years of experience at the current agency. 
Table 4.8 tests whether respondent characteristics moderate the relationship 
between the key predictor variables and perceived obligation to obey among residents in 
high crime areas. Two key findings warrant discussion. First, the racial 
minority*procedural justice interaction is significantly and negatively associated with 
perceived obligation to obey among citizens in high crime areas (b = -.602, p < .01). 
Figure 4.4 plots the slope of procedural justice on obligation to obey for minority 
respondents and white respondents, respectively. As seen in the figure, increasing levels 





Figure 4.2. Interaction between distributive justice and 10 years in position on perceived 





Figure 4.3. Interaction between performance and 10 years in position on perceived trust 
in high crime areas. 
 
of obligation to obey the police for minority respondents. Conversely, white respondents 
tend to believe greater perceived procedural justice is associated with an increased 
obligation to obey among citizens in high crime areas. 
 Second, the 10 years in position*performance interaction is significantly and 
negatively associated with perceived obligation to obey among citizens residing in high 
crime areas (b = -.408, p < .05). Figure 4.5 plots the slope of performance on obligation 
to obey for those with 10 or more years in their current position and those with less than 
10 years in their current position. As the figure illustrates, respondents who have been in 






Table 4.8. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on obligation to obey in high crime areas across respondent 
characteristics. 
 
 Obligation to obey—High crime areasa 
Variable [Executive] [Male] [Racial minority] [10 years at agency] [10 years in position] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] .067 .152 .460 .268 -.602** .171 -.022 .157 .304 .168 
Distributive justice x [Var] -.334 .345 -1.077 .727 -.057 .309 .415 .379 .209 .322 
Performance x [Var] -.173 .151 .134 .295 .306 .166 .152 .192 -.408* .205 
Procedural justice .136 .131 -.224 .258 .266** .068 .187 .113 .113 .090 
Distributive justice .580* .272 1.330 .698 .340 .189 .104 .349 .301 .205 
Performance .291* .131 .042 .300 .147 .094 .043 .153 .279** .077 
Executive -.033 .360 .053 .424 -.030 .402 -.079 .381 .016 .415 
Male .460 .739 -.326 .610 -.193 .564 .284 .668 .436 .680 
Racial minority -.774 .422 -.550 .448 -.621 .355 -.728 .424 -.700 .427 
10 years at agency .671 .387 .718 .389 .655 .366 .480 .358 .686 .384 
10 years in position -.584 .481 -.635 .502 -.546 .503 -.573 .491 -.362 .403 
Police departmentb -.235 .328 -.236 .346 -.209 .326 -.222 .336 -.268 .335 
Midwest .310 .430 .417 .452 .444 .442 .248 .388 .208 .441 
South .579 .461 .612 .492 .668 .491 .668 .469 .502 .481 
West .811* .389 .803* .372 .787* .367 .851* .404 .574 .401 
Large city -.407 .356 -.441 .351 -.376 .325 -.479 .336 -.308 .320 
Collective efficacy -.033 .050 -.047 .055 -.036 .054 -.043 .051 -.040 .055 
Disorder .048 .036 .053 .034 .053 .033 .038 .035 .049 .033 
Perceived risk -.045 .082 -.004 .087 -.026 .086 -.017 .084 -.018 .089 
Legal cynicism -.040 .057 -.027 .058 -.017 .056 -.059 .057 -.025 .059 
Intercept 9.431** 1.756 9.550** 1.868 9.366** 1.758 9.939** 1.686 9.018** 1.706 
F test 8.00** 7.64** 8.36** 11.06** 6.28** 
R2 .41 .40 .42 .42 .42 





Figure 4.4. Interaction between procedural justice and race on perceived obligation to 
obey in high crime areas. 
 
police are performing, the less they feel obligated to obey the police. On the other hand, 
those with less than 10 years in their current position tend to believe citizens feel more 
obligated to obey the police as their evaluation of police performance increases. Again, 
this might be an indication that officers who have held their position for a longer period 
of time are more cynical of residents living in high crime areas, and believe that at least 
for these citizens, “better performance” is akin to overly aggressive policing. Finally, the 
effect of distributive justice on citizens’ obligation to obey in high crime areas is 
invariant across all respondent characteristics while the effects of procedural justice and 





Figure 4.5. Interaction between performance and 10 years in position on perceived 
obligation to obey in low crime areas. 
 
 Table 4.9 provides a test of whether respondent characteristics moderate the 
relationship between the key predictor variables and perceived trust among residents of 
low crime areas. None of the interaction effects have a statistically significant 
relationship with perceived level of trust among citizens of these areas. That is, regardless 
of rank, gender, race, or experience (at the agency or in the current position), respondents 
tend to hold similar views about the relationship between perceived procedural justice, 
distributive justice, and performance and trust among citizens living in low crime areas. 
Put differently, none of these individual respondent characteristics moderate the 






Table 4.9. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust in low crime areas across respondent characteristics. 
 
 Trust in the police—Low crime areasa 
Variable [Executive] [Male] [Racial minority] [10 years at agency] [10 years in position] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] -.202 .107 .099 .275 .111 .164 -.041 .095 .106 .152 
Distributive justice x [Var] -.094 .277 -.099 .295 .798 .411 -.190 .235 .930 .504 
Performance x [Var] .015 .082 .049 .177 -.148 .107 .049 .082 -.158 .093 
Procedural justice .321** .090 .088 .268 .171** .052 .209** .076 .216** .052 
Distributive justice .424 .247 .384 .262 .192 .117 .489** .166 .234* .108 
Performance .085 .070 .049 .172 .123** .041 .062 .065 .116** .040 
Executive .232 .273 .270 .348 -.309 .277 .286 .340 .246 .258 
Male -.329 .281 -.249 .285 -.842 .486 -.384 .332 -.247 .261 
Racial minority -.389 .305 -.436 .359 -.354 .243 -.451 .337 -.311 .243 
10 years at agency -.153 .195 -.113 .216 -.056 .206 -.094 .219 -.166 .180 
10 years in position -.343 .308 -.365 .367 -.367 .295 -.384 .380 -.312 .294 
Police departmentb -.136 .163 -.141 .173 -.130 .162 -.162 .170 -.187 .178 
Midwest .147 .265 .168 .274 .113 .243 .189 .270 .134 .246 
South .269 .303 .315 .333 .245 .282 .323 .334 .211 .264 
West .436 .295 .470 .299 .371 .259 .486 .13 .381 .268 
Large city .024 .237 .013 .249 .001 .216 .013 .244 .007 .242 
Collective efficacy .011 .023 -.002 .025 .008 .024 .001 .026 -.013 .025 
Disorder .040* .018 .033 .021 .045* .019 .029 .021 .037 .019 
Perceived risk -.085** .033 -.076* .034 -.066* .033 -.075* .033 -.068* .032 
Legal cynicism -.054 .033 -.034 .038 -.041 .035 -.033 .038 -.037 .036 
Intercept 11.218** 1.013 11.170** 1.070 11.236** 1.072 11.225** 1.044 11.455** 1.035 
F test 10.66** 16.13** 13.50** 14.01** 17.77** 
R2 .54 .52 .57 .53 .55 
a Ordinary Least Squares regression; b “Sheriff’s Department” is the reference category; *p < .05, **p < .01  
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Table 4.10 tests whether respondent characteristics moderate the relationship 
between the key predictor variables and perceived obligation to obey among residents of 
low crime areas. Two important findings emerge. First, the executive*procedural justice 
interaction is statistically significant (b = -.503, p < .05). This relationship is depicted 
graphically in Figure 4.6, which plots the slope of procedural justice on obligation to 
obey among citizens in low crime areas among executives and non-executives, 
respectively. Executives in this sample believe that greater perceived procedural justice is 
associated with less obligation to obey among citizens of low crime areas. Non-
executives, on the other hand, believe greater perceived procedural justice is met with 
increased obligation to obey among citizens of low crime areas. Perhaps executives in 
this sample believe citizens in these areas associate procedurally just policing as being 
too soft on lawbreakers. As such, they might believe that citizens are less likely to feel 
obligated to obey a police department that is too soft or lenient with criminals. 
 Second, the male*distributive justice interaction is also statistically significant (b 
= 1.224, p < .01). This suggests that male respondents in this sample are more likely to 
believe greater perceived distributive fairness is associated with citizens’ obligation to 
obey the police in low crime areas relative to female respondents. Figure 4.7 plots the 
slope of distributive justice on obligation to obey in low crime areas among male and 
female respondents, respectively. Indeed, the slope is positive for males, which indicates 
that male respondents tend to believe that the more citizens of low crime areas believe 
police fairly distribute outcomes and services, the more likely they will feel obligated to 






Table 4.10. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on obligation to obey in low crime areas across respondent 
characteristics. 
 
 Obligation to obey—Low crime areasa 
Variable [Executive] [Male] [Racial minority] [10 years at agency] [10 years in position] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] -.503* .242 -.213 .269 .150 .290 .159 .308 -.391 .313 
Distributive justice x [Var] .130 .460 1.224** .388 -.097 .548 -.463 .605 .926 .631 
Performance x [Var] .097 .119 .264 .199 -.034 .195 .231 .193 .076 .208 
Procedural justice .325** .122 .170 .216 -.042 .170 -.122 .287 .066 .179 
Distributive justice .279 .283 -.691** .267 .402 .300 .697 .555 .250 .316 
Performance .137* .067 -.068 .202 .219* .101 .048 .168 .169 .088 
Executive .485 .359 .317 .377 .502 .380 .580 .369 .442 .333 
Male -.829 .629 -.003 .450 -.877 .660 -.926 .615 -.758 .587 
Racial minority -.609* .307 -.786* .359 -.620 .348 -.760* .339 -.504 .295 
10 years at agency .317 .343 .331 .339 .387 .343 .487 .359 .390 .347 
10 years in position -.633 .386 -.533 .429 -.645 .429 -.647 .422 -.788* .358 
Police departmentb .076 .311 .115 .301 .090 .305 .143 .299 .012 .291 
Midwest .281 .465 .341 .490 .357 .488 .263 .489 .356 .463 
South .714 .404 .735 .416 .777 .415 .749 .411 .782* .390 
West .889* .448 .979* .470 .971* .469 1.000* .456 1.011* .448 
Large city -.032 .396 -.090 .380 -.126 .406 -.100 .425 -.115 .403 
Collective efficacy .040 .048 .012 .051 .012 .051 .033 .047 .009 .048 
Disorder .068 .044 .051 .045 .061 .045 .058 .045 .053 .042 
Perceived risk .102 .076 .125 .082 .126 .084 .101 .072 .135 .072 
Legal cynicism .089 .064 .116 .065 .114 .065 .107 .066 .114 .065 
Intercept 6.000** 1.623 5.582** 1.696 6.174** 1.686 5.981** 1.695 6.167** 1.565 
F test 3.69** 6.58** 2.90** 3.02** 3.57** 
R2 .25 .24 .23 .24 .25 





Figure 4.6. Interaction between procedural justice and chief executive on perceived 






Figure 4.7. Interaction between distributive justice and gender on perceived obligation to 
obey in low crime areas. 
 
citizens in low crime areas, increasing levels of distributive justice are met with waning 
feelings of obligation to obey the police. 
Agency Characteristics 
 Table 4.11 tests whether agency characteristics moderate the relationship between 
the key predictor variables and: (1) trust, and (2) perceived obligation to obey among 
residents of high crime areas. A separate OLS regression equation was estimated for two 
agency characteristics: police department (1 = municipal or county police department, 0 
= sheriff’s agency) and large city (1 = jurisdiction with population of 210,000 or more, 0 
= jurisdiction with less than 210,000 residents). For each equation, a mean-centered, 
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multiplicative interaction term between each of the key predictor variables and the 
agency characteristic under consideration was created. The analyses show that none of 
the interaction terms are statistically significant. This indicates that the perceived effect 
of key predictor variables on both trust and obligation to obey among citizens of high 
crime areas are invariant across the two agency characteristics being considered. 
Regardless of whether the respondent worked for a police department or a sheriff’s 
agency, and regardless of whether the respondent worked at an agency in a large city, the 
key predictor variables are believed to be associated with trust and obligation to obey 
among citizens of high crime areas to a similar degree. 
 Table 4.12 tests whether agency characteristics moderate the relationship between 
the key predictor variables and: (1) trust, and (2) perceived obligation to obey among 
residents of low crime areas. Only one interaction term emerges as statistically 
significant: the effect of police department*procedural justice on obligation to obey in 
low crime areas (b = -.591, p < .01). This relationship is depicted in Figure 4.8, which 
plots the slope of procedural justice onto obligation to obey for respondents from police 
departments and sheriff’s departments, respectively. As shown in the figure, respondents 
in this sample who work for county or municipal police departments believe that greater 
perceived procedural justice is negatively related to obligation to obey among residents of 
low crime areas. On the flipside, respondents from sheriff’s departments believe greater 







Table 4.11. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust and obligation to obey in high crime areas across agency 
characteristics. 
 
 Trust in the police—High crime areasa Obligation to obey—High crime areasa 
Variable [Police departmentb] [Large city] [Police departmentb] [Large city] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] .051 .134 -.088 .080 -.056 .121 .052 .138 
Distributive justice x [Var] -.087 .240 -.048 .149 .029 .306 -.277 .279 
Performance x [Var] .017 .087 .049 .065 .034 .122 -.093 .126 
Procedural justice .188 .130 .230** .060 .227** .081 .182* .074 
Distributive justice .329 .229 .261* .110 .312 .175 .338 .185 
Performance .072 .072 .085* .039 .150* .075 .183* .092 
Executive -.242 .164 -.248 .168 -.074 .422 -.074 .416 
Male .145 .258 .140 .259 .385 .725 .400 .729 
Racial minority .243 .169 .239 .164 -.672 .444 -.685 .450 
10 years at agency -.023 .190 -.034 .188 .634 .391 .640 .387 
10 years in position -.059 .194 -.081 .211 -.602 .520 -.583 .503 
Police departmentb .063 .183 .083 .178 -.278 .326 -.263 .349 
Midwest -.069 .246 -.059 .171 .412 .461 .404 .458 
South -.289 .240 -.062 .245 .584 .493 .574 .499 
West .243 .240 -.278 .239 .849* .393 .847* .394 
Large city -.086 .179 .256 .244 -.434 .330 -.521 .321 
Collective efficacy -.023 .027 -.020 .029 -.044 .057 -.046 .056 
Disorder .061** .019 .063** .020 .045 .035 .045 .035 
Perceived risk .018 .026 .017 .026 -.014 .086 -.013 .08 
Legal cynicism -.088** .032 -.090** .032 -.043 .060 -.042 .057 
Intercept 9.409** .973 9.349** 1.017 9.385** 1.893 9.377** 1.837 
F test 19.97** 27.78** 9.41** 7.68** 
R2 .64 .64 .39 .39 






Table 4.12. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust and obligation to obey in low crime areas across agency 
characteristics. 
 
 Trust in the police—Low crime areasa Obligation to obey—Low crime areasa 
Variable [Police departmentb] [Large city] [Police departmentb] [Large city] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] -.063 .172 -.061 .145 -.591** .229 .013 .264 
Distributive justice x [Var] .265 .262 .010 .268 .316 .437 .261 .479 
Performance x [Var] -.008 .078 -.024 .068 .076 .147 -.231 .146 
Procedural justice .239 .156 .187** .052 .454** .149 -.029 .165 
Distributive justice .144 .205 .366** .130 .108 .278 .384 .293 
Performance .110 .068 .101* .040 .143 .097 .229* .102 
Executive .272 .340 .287 .345 .486 .376 .524 .381 
Male -.394 .331 -.389 .328 -.924 .606 -.845 .618 
Racial minority -.404 .342 -.412 .349 -.654 .351 -.637 .354 
10 years at agency -.110 .216 -.106 .214 .342 .342 .403 .347 
10 years in position -.390 .368 -.376 .367 -.659 .418 -.647 .432 
Police departmentb -.171 .172 -.147 .172 .116 .281 .096 .302 
Midwest .152 .271 .168 .275 .474 .494 .339 .487 
South .317 .329 .314 .331 .829* .420 .790 .420 
West .452 .296 .460 .299 1.014* .469 .954* .468 
Large city -.019 .240 .001 .219 -.038 .388 -.083 .363 
Collective efficacy -.001 .025 -.002 .025 .004 .049 .012 .050 
Disorder .034 .020 .034 .021 .056 .044 .061 .046 
Perceived risk -.077* .034 -.076* .034 .121 .080 .119 .083 
Legal cynicism -.034 .040 -.035 .038 .076 .063 .116 .065 
Intercept 11.330** 1.090 11.303** 1.065 6.932** 1.668 6.175** 1.679 
F test 11.33** 14.18** 5.27** 3.30** 
R2 .53 .52 .25 .23 





Figure 4.8. Interaction between procedural justice and police department on perceived 
obligation to obey in low crime areas. 
 
Invariance across Other Potentially Moderating Variables 
 The final step of the analysis seeks to determine whether four contextual 
variables—collective efficacy, disorder, perceived risk, and legal cynicism—moderate 
the perceived relationship between the key predictor variables and trust and obligation to 
obey in high and low crime areas, respectively. Table 4.13 displays the results of this test 
with regard to perceived trust in the police among citizens in high crime areas. A separate 
OLS regression equation was estimated for each of four perceived contextual variables: 
collective efficacy, disorder, perceived risk, and legal cynicism. For each equation, a 
mean-centered, multiplicative interaction term between each of the key predictor 
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variables and the perceived contextual variable under consideration was created. None of 
the interaction terms are significant, which suggests that respondents believe the effects 
of key predictor variables on trust among citizens in these areas are invariant across 
perceptions of collective efficacy, levels of disorder, and perceived risk associated with 
breaking the law, as well as their cynicism toward the law. In other words, respondents 
feel citizens’ perceptions of procedural justice, distributive justice, and performance 
shape their trust in the police to a similar degree regardless of their beliefs concerning the 
amount of collective efficacy present in their area, the level of disorder in their area, their 
perceived risk of being caught and punished for breaking the law, and their cynicism (or 
lack thereof) toward the law. 
 Table 4.14 tests whether the same contextual variables moderate the perceived 
relationship between the key predictor variables and obligation to obey among citizens 
residing in high crime areas. The disorder*procedural justice interaction is significantly 
and negatively associated with obligation to obey (b = -.042, p < .05). Figure 4.9 plots the 
slope of procedural justice on obligation to obey for three levels of perceived disorder: 
minimum, average, and maximum. The graph demonstrates that respondents believe 
when citizens who live in high crime areas perceive minimal levels of disorder, 
procedural justice has almost no effect on their feelings of obligation to obey the police. 
On the other hand, respondents feel that when citizens in high crime areas perceive 
average to maximal levels of disorder, procedural justice has an inverse relationship with 
their feelings of obligation to obey. Thus, among such citizens in particular, respondents 
feel that greater perceived procedural justice is met with less obligation to obey the 







Table 4.13. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust in high crime areas across perceived context. 
 
 Trust in the police—High crime areasa 
Variable [Collective efficacy] [Disorder] [Perceived risk] [Legal cynicism] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] .003 .012 -.015 .014 .011 .011 -.005 .012 
Distributive justice x [Var] .030 .022 .005 .030 -.040 .032 .020 .029 
Performance x [Var] -.001 .009 -.001 .011 .006 .012 -.016 .011 
Procedural justice .213** .056 .217** .057 .222** .061 .241** .055 
Distributive justice .238** .091 .241* .105 .285** .110 .249* .106 
Performance .103** .034 .089** .033 .078* .037 .082* .035 
Executive -.224 .165 -.194 .171 -.273 .173 -.200 .173 
Male .050 .256 .059 .266 .254 .282 .073 .267 
Racial minority .215 .166 .259 .160 .221 .164 .245 .167 
10 years at agency -.051 .183 -.006 .191 -.049 .188 -.060 .193 
10 years in position -.086 .200 -.146 .201 .069 .205 .001 .201 
Police departmentb .129 .171 .078 .181 .076 .175 .025 .172 
Midwest -.057 .216 -.095 .220 -.098 .240 -.163 .212 
South -.341 .217 -.271 .235 -.308 .233 -.365 .220 
West .181 .232 .227 .240 .268 .241 .241 .230 
Large city -.036 .161 -.047 .179 -.082 .168 -.098 .169 
Collective efficacy -.029 .027 -.018 .028 -.023 .029 -.026 .028 
Disorder .063** .018 .072** .018 .058** .019 .067** .019 
Perceived risk .031 .028 .024 .025 .015 .026 .021 .025 
Legal cynicism -.077** .030 -.081** .031 -.096** .032 -.078* .031 
Intercept 8.508** .685 9.884** .918 9.755** 1.067 8.280** .813 
F test 31.06** 26.35** 20.99** 24.97** 
R2 .65 .64 .64 .65 
a Ordinary Least Squares regression; b “Sheriff’s Department” is the reference category; *p < .05, **p < .01 
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disorder think procedural fairness is too merciful, and instead prefer the police to be more 
authoritarian when dealing with lawbreakers. None of the other interaction terms are 
statistically significant, which suggests the police feel that collective efficacy, perceived 
risk, and legal cynicism have no discernable effect on the relationship between the key 
predictor variables and citizens’ obligation to obey the police (in high crime areas). 
 Table 4.15 tests whether the aforementioned contextual variables moderate the 
perceived relationship between the key predictor variables and trust in the police among 
citizens residing in low crime areas. The findings suggest that respondents feel these 
contextual variables have little effect on the relationship between key predictor variables 
and trust—with one exception. Perceived risk*procedural justice is the only statistically 
significant interaction term (b = .034, p < .05), which suggests that respondents in this 
sample feel that among citizens residing in low crime areas, their perceived risk of being 
caught and punished for breaking the law moderates the relationship between procedural 
justice and trust in the police. Figure 4.10 plots the slope of procedural justice on trust in 
the police for three levels of perceived risk: minimum, average, and maximum. The graph 
reveals that respondents in this sample feel the relationship between procedural justice 
and trust in the police among citizens residing in low crime areas is strongest among 
those who perceive a greater risk of being caught and punished for law-breaking 
behavior. Thus, respondents believe that in low crime areas, procedurally fair policing is 
most likely to enhance trust in the eyes of those citizens who view the police as a 
deterrent. 
 Table 4.16 tests whether the aforementioned contextual variables moderate the 







Table 4.14. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on obligation to obey in high crime areas across perceived context. 
 
 Obligation to obey—High crime areasa 
Variable [Collective efficacy] [Disorder] [Perceived risk] [Legal cynicism] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] .008 .014 -.042* .021 .026 .043 .033 .021 
Distributive justice x [Var] .015 .045 .023 .057 -.015 .071 .053 .062 
Performance x [Var] -.020 .017 .018 .018 .017 .031 .018 .021 
Procedural justice .142 .073 .164* .064 .149* .063 .207** .072 
Distributive justice .336 .180 .283 .156 .337 .182 .307 .178 
Performance .188* .089 .200* .089 .123 .075 .187* .090 
Executive -.079 .414 -.005 .405 .032 .399 -.068 .389 
Male .438 .700 .233 .603 .465 .710 .249 .609 
Racial minority -.651 .451 -.609 .453 -.707 .454 -.667 .445 
10 years at agency .684 .392 .717 .392 .617 .369 .761 .393 
10 years in position -.619 .504 -.723 .499 -.471 .473 -.692 .487 
Police departmentb -.302 .357 -.224 .351 -.365 .330 -.243 .352 
Midwest .518 .454 .388 .403 .401 .443 .362 .390 
South .594 .477 .569 .491 .707 .504 .574 .473 
West .878* .384 .809* .387 .952* .388 .793* .368 
Large city -.430 .340 -.348 .347 -.502 .316 -.407 .357 
Collective efficacy -.033 .054 -.040 .051 -.031 .051 -.052 .055 
Disorder .035 .035 .052 .034 .029 .035 .036 .034 
Perceived risk -.009 .087 .012 .085 -.017 .081 .000 .088 
Legal cynicism -.061 .057 -.036 .058 -.060 .056 -.046 .054 
Intercept 8.585** 1.923 9.440** 1.735 9.150** 1.785 9.042** 1.361 
F test 9.78** 7.51** 8.42** 9.65** 
R2 .40 .40 .41 .40 





Figure 4.9. Interaction between procedural justice and disorder on perceived obligation to 







Table 4.15. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on trust in low crime areas across perceived context. 
 
 Trust in the police—Low crime areasa 
Variable [Collective efficacy] [Disorder] [Perceived risk] [Legal cynicism] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] -.002 .011 -.002 .012 .034* .014 .012 .014 
Distributive justice x [Var] -.011 .021 -.010 .025 -.053 .040 -.010 .041 
Performance x [Var] -.012 .009 .008 .009 -.013 .014 .013 .014 
Procedural justice .181** .049 .187** .051 .172** .051 .180** .051 
Distributive justice .385** .121 .355** .129 .405** .117 .357** .120 
Performance .087* .037 .105** .039 .088** .033 .095* .039 
Executive .327 .345 .281 .339 .322 .350 .300 .348 
Male -.412 .330 -.363 .345 -.423 .313 -.367 .339 
Racial minority -.437 .350 -.419 .340 -.427 .336 -.409 .342 
10 years at agency -.082 .208 -.116 .227 -.075 .216 -.122 .213 
10 years in position -.391 .358 -.401 .367 -.395 .360 -.397 .369 
Police departmentb -.176 .171 -.167 .161 -.126 .162 -.120 .177 
Midwest .183 .268 .173 .267 .095 .270 .225 .276 
South .371 .317 .295 .332 .343 .323 .346 .333 
West .462 .293 .457 .301 .464 .287 .491 .306 
Large city -.001 .253 .003 .242 .088 .216 .025 .236 
Collective efficacy .017 .023 -.002 .025 .010 .024 .001 .025 
Disorder .031 .020 .031 .022 .020 .020 .031 .021 
Perceived risk -.076* .030 -.073* .033 -.065* .032 -.073* .035 
Legal cynicism -.045 .037 -.035 .038 -.021 .038 -.055 .034 
Intercept 11.451** .695 11.706** 1.045 9.908** 1.006 10.822** .933 
F test 15.10** 13.07** 14.34** 14.24** 
R2 .54 .52 .54 .53 






Figure 4.10. Interaction between procedural justice and perceived risk on perceived trust 
in low crime areas. 
 
police among citizens residing in low crime areas. Two key findings warrant discussion. 
First, the collective efficacy*performance interaction term is significantly and negatively 
associated with obligation to obey (b = -.051, p < .05). Thus, respondents feel that in low 
crime areas, the strength of the performance-obligation to obey relationship hinges at 
least in part on the amount of collective efficacy citizens feel is present in the area. Figure 
4.11 plots the slope of performance on obligation to obey for three levels of perceived 
collective efficacy: minimum, average, and maximum. The graph indicates that 
respondents believe the relationship between performance and obligation to obey is 
strongest among those who perceive greater levels of collective efficacy. More 
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specifically, respondents feel that among citizens who perceive average to maximal levels 
of collective efficacy, greater perceived performance is associated with less obligation to 
obey the police. This could perhaps be attributed to a belief on the part of respondents 
that citizens who perceive a greater amount of collective efficacy prefer the police allow 
the community to enforce societal norms informally. Indeed, perhaps the police believe 
these citizens are more likely to perceive the police as overly aggressive, and as such, feel 
less obligated to obey them.  
 Second, the perceived risk*procedural justice interaction term is significantly and 
positively associated with obligation to obey (b = .114, p < .05). This suggests that 
respondents believe that among citizens living in low crime areas, the extent to which 
procedural justice is associated with their feelings of obligation to obey is contingent 
upon how likely it is they believe they would be caught and punished if they engage in 
crime. Figure 4.12 plots the slope of procedural justice on obligation to obey for three 
levels of perceived risk: minimum, average, and maximum. As shown in the graph, 
respondents feel the procedural justice-obligation to obey relationship is strongest among 
those citizens who view the police as a stronger deterrent. Thus it is these individuals 
whose feelings of obligation to obey the respondents believe can be enhanced by 
exercising authority in a procedurally fair manner. Finally, the results indicate that 
disorder and legal cynicism do not appear to moderate the relationship between any of the 
key predictor variables and obligation to obey the police among citizens living in low 







Table 4.16. The perceived effect of key predictor variables on obligation to obey in low crime areas across perceived context. 
 
 Obligation to obey—Low crime areasa 
Variable [Collective efficacy] [Disorder] [Perceived risk] [Legal cynicism] 
 b SE b SE b SE b SE 
Procedural justice x [Var] -.006 .034 .032 .040 .114* .049 .045 .042 
Distributive justice x [Var] .071 .070 -.101 .064 -.098 .074 -.067 .111 
Performance x [Var] -.051* .022 .013 .021 -.023 .028 .043 .033 
Procedural justice -.024 .138 .004 .134 -.093 .159 -.037 .146 
Distributive justice .431 .247 .301 .226 .489 .271 .379 .284 
Performance .190* .091 .248* .103 .177* .086 .203* .101 
Executive .660 .386 .522 .379 .657 .367 .551 .380 
Male -.775 .626 -.711 .580 -.842 .608 -.756 .660 
Racial minority -.625 .346 -.706* .359 -.606 .346 -.638 .343 
10 years at agency .394 .316 .338 .339 .500 .357 .339 .325 
10 years in position -.708 .415 -.653 .423 -.671 .396 -.696 .435 
Police departmentb .040 .295 .069 .285 .171 .280 .190 .297 
Midwest .261 .457 .423 .465 .087 .542 .533 .487 
South .781* .379 .714 .416 .851* .426 .888* .427 
West .909* .464 .913* .451 .900* .458 1.047* .481 
Large city -.012 .432 -.111 .421 .144 .341 .009 .389 
Collective efficacy .047 .051 .004 .052 .050 .046 .017 .053 
Disorder .052 .041 .054 .046 .023 .033 .050 .042 
Perceived risk .110 .066 .104 .070 .112 .058 .135 .086 
Legal cynicism .105 .065 .099 .064 .157* .063 .059 .066 
Intercept 6.982** 1.341 7.586** 1.788 6.518** 1.566 7.225** 1.431 
F test 4.09** 3.26** 3.87** 3.52** 
R2 .26 .25 .28 .25 





Figure 4.11. Interaction between performance and perceived collective efficacy on 





Figure 4.12. Interaction between procedural justice and perceived risk on perceived 





The process-based model of policing hypothesizes that when citizens perceive 
authority figures such as the police as legitimate, they are more likely to comply and 
cooperate (Tyler & Huo, 2002). The best way for the police to enhance their legitimacy, 
according to Tyler (1990, 2004), is to exercise their authority in a procedurally fair 
manner when interacting with the public. Scholars have devoted a great deal of attention 
to the sources and consequences of legitimacy using citizen surveys. Until very recently, 
they have neglected the perspectives of the other party involved in police-citizen 
interactions: the police. Accordingly, Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, p. 119) argue that 
scholars must consider the “dual and interactive character of legitimacy.” Doing so is 
crucial because the police may not be aware that procedural justice is the best way to 
enhance their legitimacy. Indeed, early findings from Israel suggest that police believe 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the public lies more so with their performance in fighting 
crime than with procedural fairness concerns (Jonathan-Zamir & Harpaz, 2014). The 
present study moved this line of literature forward by asking law enforcement executives 
across the United States how they feel they are viewed by citizens from different areas 
within the community—namely, residents of high and low crime areas. A number of key 
findings emerged which warrant further discussion. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the findings with respect to the first two research questions. 
That is, (1) what do the police see as the foundation of their legitimacy in the eyes of the 
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public, and (2) do the police believe being perceived as legitimate increases cooperation 
from the public? With respect to the first question, the data reveal that officers in this 
sample believe procedural justice, distributive justice, and performance are all positively 
associated with citizens’ levels of trust in both high and low crime areas of the 
community. In high crime areas, procedural justice is more closely connected to 
perceived levels of trust than either distributive justice or performance. That is, officers in 
this sample believe the best way to go about instilling trust in residents of high crime 
areas is to handle interactions in a procedurally fair manner (i.e., quality of decision-
making and quality of interpersonal treatment). The same cannot be said of low crime 
areas: the procedural justice estimate is smaller and closer in magnitude to the 
distributive justice and performance estimates. This suggests that officers in the sample 
believe procedural justice to be a more effective means of garnering trust from residents 
of high crime areas than residents of low crime areas.  
Contrary to Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz (2014), officers did not believe 
performance was more important than procedural fairness in terms of its role in 
generating citizen trust. This is an important finding given this is only the second study of 
its kind and the first to be carried out with a U.S. sample. There are striking differences 
between policing in the U.S. context and the Israeli context which might account for this 
discrepancy. For example, Jonathan-Zamir and Harpaz (2014) surveyed officers from one 
centralized, national police force. The present study utilized surveys from executive 
officers at 643 local police/sheriff’s departments all across the United States. These local 
police departments are undoubtedly less concerned with homeland security than the 
Israeli National Police (INP)—although terrorism preparedness is much more 
 
113 
Table 5.1. Summary of main effects.a 
 













Procedural justice + + + ns ns ns 
Distributive justice + + ns ns ns ns 
Performance + + + + + + 
Trust --- --- --- --- ns ns 
Obligation to obey --- --- --- --- ns ns 
Executive ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Male ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Racial minority ns ns ns ns ns ns 
10 years at agency ns ns ns ns ns ns 
10 years in position ns ns ns ns + ns 
Police department ns ns ns ns - ns 
Midwest ns ns ns ns ns ns 
South ns ns ns ns ns ns 
West ns ns + + ns ns 
Large city ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Collective efficacy ns ns ns ns + + 
Disorder + ns ns ns ns ns 
Perceived risk ns - ns ns - ns 
Legal cynicism - ns ns ns - ns 
a Note: “ns” = nonsignificant relationship. 
 
 
salient in the U.S. post 9/11 (McGarrell, Freilich, & Shermack, 2007). Given the 
uncertainty surrounding national security in Israel, and the constantly looming threat of 
terrorist attacks, it is perhaps not surprising that the INP would believe Israeli citizens are 
more concerned with performance than procedural fairness. On the other hand, the 643 
agencies represented in the present data each serve a unique community that has its own 
unique expectations of a police force. Policing is much more localized in the U.S.—and 
this is reflected in the data. Finally, concerns about fair treatment may be more germane 
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to the U.S. context, given that it is a nation founded on ideas such as fairness, equal 
treatment, and protection against a tyrannical government. 
Although officers in the present sample do not believe performance is most 
important to citizens in terms of generating trust, they do recognize that it is important 
nonetheless—regardless of the amount of crime in an area. A slightly different set of 
findings emerge with regard to perceived feelings of obligation to obey. In high crime 
areas, officers in the sample believe procedural justice and performance are positively 
associated with citizens’ feelings of obligation to obey the police. Yet in low crime areas, 
only performance is significantly associated with obligation to obey. This indicates that 
officers in the sample believe citizens obey the police for different reasons in part 
depending on the level of crime in their area. Whereas in high crime areas, officers feel 
procedural justice can be an effective means of generating feelings of obligation to obey 
the police, the same is not true of low crime areas. Perhaps officers are aware that citizens 
residing in high crime areas interact with the police more regularly than citizens residing 
in low crime areas. Consequently, they understand that these citizens are especially likely 
to be concerned with how the police treat people during those interactions. On the other 
hand, officers may believe citizens in low crime areas place importance on performance 
because they interact with the police less frequently and, as such, are less concerned 
about treatment. As a result, officers reason that these citizens feel more obligated to 
obey the police simply because the police are effectively suppressing crime (Tyler, 2005; 
Wilson & Kelling, 1982).  
 Collectively, the present findings are partially supportive of Tyler and Huo’s 
(2002) process-based model of regulation. Officers in this sample believe that citizens 
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focus on procedural fairness when assessing the trustworthiness of the police. However, 
strict adherence to the process-based model would suggest that procedural justice should 
outweigh citizens’ concerns regarding distributive fairness or the performance of the 
police. Yet in both high and low crime areas, distributive fairness and performance 
remain significantly associated with perceived levels of citizen trust after accounting for 
variations in procedural justice. Furthermore, in low crime areas, the procedural justice 
estimate is equal in magnitude to the distributive justice estimate—meaning officers 
believe the two concepts to be equally important in the minds of citizens. With regard to 
obligation to obey, officers in the present sample indicate that performance is just as 
important as procedural justice in high crime areas, whereas in low crime areas, 
procedural justice is not significant. Thus, the present data suggest that the police are not 
aware that procedural justice is the primary antecedent of legitimacy. While they 
recognize its importance in the eyes of the public, they still tend to believe distributive 
fairness and performance are important in terms of being perceived as legitimate by the 
public. 
 With respect to the second research question, the data reveal that officers in the 
present sample believe performance to be the primary means of attaining cooperation 
from citizens in both high and low crime areas. This finding contradicts Tyler’s process-
based model of regulation, which suggests that cooperation from the public is most likely 
to occur when the police are procedurally fair, thereby enhancing their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the public. In other words, according to the process-based model, procedural 
justice promotes cooperation through its effect on legitimacy perceptions (i.e., trust in the 
police and obligation to obey). The present sample does not perceive this to be the case. 
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Although procedural justice was significantly associated with trust (in both high and low 
crime areas) and obligation to obey (in high crime areas), it was not significantly 
associated with cooperation in either high or low crime areas. Trust and obligation to 
obey also failed to exert a significant effect on cooperation. Instead, officers believe 
citizens are most likely to cooperate with the police when they believe the police are 
effectively dealing with crime in the community (Tankebe, 2009). At the same time, 
officers also believe that context matters. In both high and low crime areas, officers 
believe greater perceived collective efficacy on the part of citizens is associated with 
higher levels of cooperation. Furthermore, in high crime areas specifically, officers 
believe that perceived risk and legal cynicism are each associated with lower levels of 
cooperation. Future studies should continue to explore the possibility that police believe 
contextual variables such as these influence their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. 
 The fact that the present sample believes performance is the key to generating 
cooperation from the public has important theoretical implications. One of the main 
appeals of Tyler’s process-based model of regulation is that in addition to complying in 
both the immediate situation and long term, citizens are more likely to cooperate with the 
police when they are procedurally fair (Jackson et al., 2012a; Tyler & Huo, 2002). That 
is, they are more likely to report crimes and provide information to the police. The police 
rely heavily on public cooperation to fight crime and disorder in the community, but the 
present data reveal that they are unaware of the best pathway to achieving said 
cooperation: procedural fairness. It is conceivable that over time, should the police stress 
performance over procedural fairness, community members might become less inclined 
to cooperate. At the very least, individuals who experience procedural injustice on one 
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occasion might be less motivated to report future victimizations and/or crimes they 
otherwise witness. This reduced willingness to cooperate could result in poorer 
performance due to fewer crimes being brought to the attention of the police. 
 The third and fourth research questions explored the possibility that situational 
and/or contextual variables could moderate the perceived relationship between key 
theoretical variables and legitimacy (i.e., trust and obligation to obey). Table 5.2 provides 
a summary of the findings with respect to the third and fourth research questions. The 
table shows that for the most part, the relationships between these key theoretical 
variables and trust and obligation to obey are invariant. Each of the four outcome 
variables (i.e., trust and obligation to obey in both high and low crime areas) were 
regressed onto 33 different interaction terms. Only 12 emerged as statistically 
significant.4 However, these 12 interaction effects provide evidence that some 
characteristics of the officer—or the agency he/she is employed at—may condition the 
way the officer believes citizens evaluate police. Along similar lines, the findings suggest 
that officers believe certain contextual variables (i.e., collective efficacy, disorder, 
perceived risk, legal cynicism) can moderate the strength of the relationship between, for 
example, procedural justice and trust in the police. It will be important for researchers to 
consider the possibility of moderation effects such as these moving forward.
                                                          
4 The greater the number of tests performed on a set of data, the greater the odds of committing a Type I 
error (i.e., rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true). In the present case, each theoretical variable of 
interest was interacted with 11 potentially moderating variables. One common practice is to use a 
Bonferonni approximation, whereby alpha levels (i.e., p values) are adjusted to account for the probability 
of making at least one Type I error for the family of tests (Abdi, 2007). In the present case, this shifts the 
.05 p value of statistical significance to 0.003. As a result of using this more conservative significance test, 
only 4 interaction terms retain statistical significance. This is further evidence that the effects of key 
predictor variables on trust and obligation to obey are invariant. 
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Table 5.2. Summary of interaction effects.a 
 
Variable: Trust Obligation to obey 













Executive ns ns ns - 
Male ns ns ns ns 
Racial minority ns ns -* ns 
10 years at agency ns ns ns ns 
10 years in position ns ns ns ns 
Police department ns ns ns - 
Large city ns ns ns ns 
Collective efficacy ns ns ns ns 
Disorder ns ns - ns 
Perceived risk ns + ns + 













Executive + ns ns ns 
Male ns ns ns +* 
Racial minority ns ns ns ns 
10 years at agency ns ns ns ns 
10 years in position +* ns ns ns 
Police department ns ns ns ns 
Large city ns ns ns ns 
Collective efficacy ns ns ns ns 
Disorder ns ns ns ns 
Perceived risk ns ns ns ns 








Executive ns ns ns ns 
Male ns ns ns ns 
Racial minority ns ns ns ns 
10 years at agency ns ns ns ns 
10 years in position -* ns - ns 
Police department ns ns ns ns 
Large city ns ns ns ns 
Collective efficacy ns ns ns - 
Disorder ns ns ns ns 
Perceived risk ns ns ns ns 
Legal cynicism ns ns ns ns 





 Bottoms and Tankebe (2012, p. 122-23) suggest that legal officials such as the 
police “must consider their legitimacy in relation to more than one audience and…these 
audiences might have significantly different priorities.” Officers in the present sample 
appear to be aware of this point. The challenge for researchers moving forward will be to 
test these complex relationships with citizen samples. For example, is procedural justice 
less associated with feelings of obligation to obey among citizens residing in high crime 
areas who perceive a greater amount of disorder? Is procedural justice more closely 
connected to trust among citizens residing in low crime areas who perceive a greater risk 
of being caught and punished for breaking the law? To date, few studies have attempted 
to answer questions such as these (Jackson et al., 2012a; Wolfe et al., 2015), making it 
difficult to discern whether the present sample’s perceptions are in line with the literature. 
Future research should also continue to explore the extent to which individual/situational 
characteristics of the officer shape his/her interpretations of police legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public. This is an especially important consideration moving forward with the 
dialogic model of legitimacy in the U.S. context because there are so many diverse law 
enforcement agencies which are themselves composed of individuals with different 
characteristics. The present study offers preliminary evidence that variables such as 
gender, race, rank, experience, and agency type moderate some of the perceived 
relationships between key theoretical variables and legitimacy. 
This study is not without limitations. For starters, the data is cross-sectional and it 
is therefore not possible to speak about the causality of the observed relationships. In 
addition, the present study only surveyed one officer at each agency in the sample. 
Roughly 50 percent of the respondents were the Chief Executive of their respective 
 
120 
agency (the remainder of respondents were hand selected by their Chief or Sheriff as an 
officer who could speak on behalf of the agency). As this is the first study of its kind in 
the U.S., it was important to gauge the perceptions of Chief Executives because the ideas 
they embrace are more likely to trickle down throughout the agency and influence line-
level officers. In Tyler’s (2011, p. 261) words: “The organizational culture of police 
departments is shaped by the values articulated by their leaders.” Nevertheless, it would 
be ideal to survey line level officers themselves moving forward, as they interact with 
citizens on a daily basis. Despite limitations such as these, the present study moves the 
procedural justice and legitimacy literatures forward by considering the dialogic nature of 
legitimacy, as Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) recommend.  
 In conclusion, the present study suggests that officers are aware of the connection 
between procedural justice and their legitimacy in the eyes of the public. At the same 
time, they do not appear to fully understand its importance with respect to increasing 
citizen cooperation. Rather, they believe performance is the key. In this respect, there 
appears to be a breakdown in the legitimacy “dialogue.” What good is research 
demonstrating that citizens cooperate with the police more so when they perceive them as 
legitimate if the police themselves do not see it that way? Of course the police believe 
performing their job well is important to citizens—but they should be made aware of the 
power of procedural justice. It bears repeating: “the police have more control over how 
they treat people than they do over the crime rate” (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003, pp. 535-36). 
 Moving forward it is incumbent upon researchers to relay this message to the 
police, especially in light of recent events in the U.S. that have sparked tension between 
minorities and the police (such as the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri 
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or the death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York). Researchers could take a variety 
of approaches when “marketing” the process-based model to the police: it can enhance 
officer safety, it can improve police-community relations, and it can expand their crime 
fighting ability. In any event, this will likely be a difficult task as there is evidence that 
police officers rely on their own experiences more so than expert opinions when 
determining “what works in policing” (Lum, Telep, Koper, & Grieco, 2012, p. 78). At the 
same time, the present data suggest that police perceptions are fairly in line with the 
evidence regarding the social-psychological process that guides citizens’ evaluations of 
police legitimacy. Still, publishing findings with respect to the process-based model in 
more practitioner-oriented magazines such as The Police Chief and Translational 
Criminology would be a good starting point. Perhaps during the course of establishing 
research-practitioner partnerships, agencies should periodically survey their own 
communities to gauge their opinions about police fairness, effectiveness, and legitimacy. 
Practitioners might be more apt to trust results generated from a sample of their own 
citizens than results of other studies conducted elsewhere by other researchers. Whatever 
approach researchers decide to take, it is imperative that the police understand the long-
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County/Municipal Police 117 42 
County Sheriff 0 0 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 259 41 
County Sheriff 0 0 
South 
County/Municipal Police 281 42 
County Sheriff 3 3 
West 
County/Municipal Police 36 36 




County/Municipal Police 1,520 43 
County Sheriff 6 6 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 3,008 43 
County Sheriff 322 42 
South 
County/Municipal Police 2,799 43 
County Sheriff 219 42 
West 
County/Municipal Police 661 42 




County/Municipal Police 923 42 
County Sheriff 52 41 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 837 42 
County Sheriff 497 42 
South 
County/Municipal Police 747 41 
County Sheriff 754 42 
West 
County/Municipal Police 361 42 




County/Municipal Police 93 42 
County Sheriff 44 41 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 120 42 
County Sheriff 98 42 
South 
County/Municipal Police 119 41 
County Sheriff 183 41 
West 
County/Municipal Police 127 42 













County/Municipal Police 37 37 
County Sheriff 100 100 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 49 49 
County Sheriff 136 136 
South 
County/Municipal Police 117 117 
County Sheriff 217 217 
West 
County/Municipal Police 97 97 

































County/Municipal Police 117 0.762% 8 1.244% 0.612 
County Sheriff 0 0 0 0 0 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 259 1.687% 8 1.244% 1.356 
County Sheriff 0 0 0 0 0 
South 
County/Municipal Police 281 1.830% 8 1.244% 1.471 
County Sheriff 3 0.020% 2 0.311% 0.064 
West 
County/Municipal Police 36 0.234% 7 1.089% 0.215 




County/Municipal Police 1,520 9.900% 9 1.400% 7.073 
County Sheriff 6 0.039% 2 0.311% 0.125 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 3,008 19.588% 15 2.333% 8.397 
County Sheriff 322 2.097% 5 0.778% 2.697 
South 
County/Municipal Police 2,799 18.227% 15 2.333% 7.813 
County Sheriff 219 1.427% 8 1.244% 1.147 
West 
County/Municipal Police 661 4.305% 10 1.555% 2.768 

































County/Municipal Police 923 6.011% 15 2.333% 2.577 
County Sheriff 52 0.339% 7 1.089% 0.311 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 837 5.451% 14 2.177% 2.504 
County Sheriff 497 3.237% 10 1.555% 2.081 
South 
County/Municipal Police 747 4.865% 14 2.177% 2.234 
County Sheriff 754 4.910% 10 1.555% 3.157 
West 
County/Municipal Police 361 2.351% 16 2.488% 0.945 




County/Municipal Police 93 0.606% 16 2.488% 0.244 
County Sheriff 44 0.287% 4 0.622% 0.461 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 120 0.781% 14 2.177% 0.359 
County Sheriff 98 0.638% 12 1.866% 0.342 
South 
County/Municipal Police 119 0.775% 21 3.266% 0.237 
County Sheriff 183 1.192% 13 2.022% 0.590 
West 
County/Municipal Police 127 0.827% 16 2.488% 0.332 




County/Municipal Police 37 0.241% 17 2.644% 0.091 
County Sheriff 100 0.651% 17 2.644% 0.246 
Midwest 
County/Municipal Police 49 0.319% 22 3.421% 0.093 
County Sheriff 136 0.886% 56 8.709% 0.102 
South 
County/Municipal Police 117 0.762% 58 9.020% 0.084 
County Sheriff 217 1.413% 76 11.820% 0.120 
West 
County/Municipal Police 97 0.632% 52 8.087% 0.078 









APPENDIX D: CORRELATION MATRIXES
Table D.1. High Crime Area Variables 
 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Procedural justice 1.0                    
2 Distributive justice .77 1.0                   
3 Performance .70 .65 1.0                  
4 Trust .71 .65 .63 1.0                 
5 Obligation to obey .52 .49 .48 .47 1.0                
6 Cooperation .61 .57 .60 .55 .41 1.0               
7 Executive .13 .12 .21 .14 .08 .16 1.0              
8 Male -.08 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.02 -.02 .12 1.0             
9 Racial minority -.01 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.02 -.04 .08 -.03 1.0            
10 10 years at agency .00 .02 -.03 .01 .00 -.01 -.29 -.03 -.04 1.0           
11 
10 years in 
position 
.07 .07 .10 .05 -.02 .10 .21 .02 -.01 .22 1.0          
12 Police department .01 .02 .08 .05 .05 .00 .10 -.05 .08 -.07 -.09 1.0         
13 Midwest .01 .03 .03 .01 .03 .02 .12 .05 -.08 .04 .08 -.10 1.0        
14 South .04 .04 -.02 -.06 .02 -.02 -.14 -.01 .09 -.05 -.03 -.05 -.42 1.0       
15 West -.01 -.02 .01 .06 .01 .03 -.05 -.05 .02 .01 -.05 .06 -.34 -.43 1.0      
16 Large city -.05 -.02 -.11 -.03 -.01 -.09 -.29 -.12 .04 .12 -.05 -.07 -.08 .10 .03 1.0     
17 Collective efficacy .46 .43 .45 .38 .31 .44 .17 .01 .06 -.01 .12 .10 -.02 -.01 .04 -.09 1.0    
18 Disorder -.13 -.13 -.27 -.07 -.10 -.13 -.09 .00 .07 .12 .04 -.06 -.06 .07 -.04 .20 -.15 1.0   
19 Perceived risk .15 .17 .19 .12 .12 .08 .13 .01 .03 .01 .06 .03 -.04 .08 -.08 -.13 .25 -.01 1.0  








Table D.2. Low Crime Area Variables 
 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Procedural justice 1.0                    
2 Distributive justice .69 1.0                   
3 Performance .66 .57 1.0                  
4 Trust .62 .54 .55 1.0                 
5 Obligation to obey .38 .35 .31 .31 1.0                
6 Cooperation .51 .47 .49 .53 .29 1.0               
7 Executive .09 .10 .12 .10 -.02 .03 1.0              
8 Male .00 .05 .03 -.01 -.02 -.01 .12 1.0             
9 Racial minority -.01 -.04 -.02 .00 -.03 .00 .08 -.03 1.0            
10 10 years at agency .02 .02 .01 -.01 .04 -.01 -.29 -.03 -.04 1.0           
11 
10 years in 
position 
.04 .02 .07 .01 -.08 .00 .21 .02 -.01 .22 1.0          
12 Police department -.05 -.07 .00 -.03 -.01 .00 .10 -.05 .08 -.07 -.09 1.0         
13 Midwest .02 .06 .03 -.01 .04 .04 .12 .05 -.08 .04 .08 -.10 1.0        
14 South .00 -.01 .01 .04 -.02 .02 -.14 -.01 .09 -.05 -.03 -.05 -.42 1.0       
15 West .03 .02 -.03 .02 .05 -.04 -.05 -.05 .02 .01 -.05 .06 -.34 -.43 1.0      
16 Large city -.06 -.05 -.08 -.02 .00 .02 -.29 -.12 .04 .12 -.05 -.07 -.08 .10 .03 1.0     
17 Collective efficacy .43 .31 .44 .40 .22 .38 .11 .02 -.04 -.02 .09 .01 .05 -.05 .04 -.02 1.0    
18 Disorder -.14 -.10 -.21 -.08 -.11 -.04 -.08 .01 .02 .10 .06 -.09 -.04 .10 -.06 .12 -.09 1.0   
19 Perceived risk .12 .07 .18 .05 .15 .12 .13 .05 -.10 .03 .10 .11 -.04 -.03 -.03 -.06 .23 .01 1.0  
20 Legal cynicism -.46 -.35 -.42 -.37 -.20 -.40 .02 -.03 .00 -.07 .04 -.06 .02 .04 -.07 -.07 -.30 .18 -.07 1.0 
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